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Access Assured: Restoring Progressivity in the Tax and 
Spending Programs for Higher Education  
Kerry A. Ryan∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Paying for a child’s college education is the single largest finan-
cial investment a parent will make in his or her child’s future.  For 
many middle-income parents, this inter vivos investment in the hu-
man capital of their child replaces intergenerational transfers at 
death in the form of bequests and inheritances.1  Trends in college 
costs, college enrollment, and the labor market suggest that college is 
more important and more expensive than ever before.  Over the past 
decade, college tuition increases outpaced both inflation and growth 
in median family income.2  Despite this, college enrollment rates con-
tinue to grow.3  One reason for the failure of tuition increases to slow 
enrollment is the increased financial returns associated with invest-
ments in higher education.4  However, these enrollment increases 
∗ Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law.  My sincerest 
thanks for the helpful comments of Martin McMahon, Tracy Kaye, Joshua Tate, Nan 
Kaufman, and Joy Mullane.  I am also grateful to Saint Louis University School of 
Law for its generous summer research grant program. 
1 See John H. Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth Trans-
mission, 86 MICH. L. REV. 722, 732–36 (1988) (arguing that for most families inter-
generational wealth transmission occurs during a parent’s lifetime via the provision 
of human capital rather than at death via the provision of physical capital). 
2 COLLEGE BOARD, TRENDS IN STUDENT AID 23 (2006), available at http://www. 
collegeboard.com/prod_downloads/press/cost06/trends_aid_06.pdf [hereinafter 
TRENDS IN STUDENT AID 2006].  While tuition and fees at public four-year institutions 
grew by an inflation-adjusted 52% (in constant 2005 dollars) over the past decade, 
median family income grew by only 3% over the same time period.  Id. 
3 SANDY BAUM & KATHLEEN PAYEA, COLLEGE BOARD, EDUCATION PAYS UPDATE 3 
(2005), available at http://www.collegeboard.com/prod_downloads/press/cost05/ 
education_pays_05.pdf.  In 1970, only 21% of the population enrolled in some form 
of college.  Id.  In 2004, over 50% of the population participated in some form of 
postsecondary education.  Id.
4 COLLEGE BOARD, EDUCATION PAYS 9 (2004), available at http://www.college 
board.com/prod_downloads/press/cost04/EducationPays2004.pdf [hereinafter 
EDUCATION PAYS 2004]. Over the course of a forty year career, a four-year college 
graduate can expect to earn 73% more in wages than the average high school gradu-
RYAN_FINAL 1/7/2008 3:39:07 PM 
2 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1 
and the associated earnings premiums have not been shared propor-
tionately among income groups.5  Students from lower-income fami-
lies still lag behind their more affluent peers in postsecondary educa-
tional attainment.6  For many low-income families, the availability of 
some form of financial assistance can be the determining factor in 
the college enrollment decision.7
Presently, the federal government subsidizes the higher educa-
tion expenses of individual college students through two distribution 
channels: the tax system and the transfer system.  Under each subsys-
tem, there are a multitude of programs available to assist students in 
meeting their postsecondary educational expenses.8  The prolifera-
tion of these many forms of federal student aid raises issues of intra- 
and inter-program effectiveness.  In their current form, the tax bene-
fits for higher education do not get the right amount to the right 
people at the right time.  The federal college spending programs, on 
the other hand, get the right amount to the right people but do so in 
the wrong manner.  The intersection of these two financial aid distri-
bution channels amplifies their individual deficiencies.  The resulting 
complex web of overlapping, contradictory, and partially or com-
pletely uncoordinated tax and spending programs impedes the gov-
ernment’s ability to achieve its public policy goal in providing federal 
student aid, namely, to expand access to college for low income stu-
dents for whom cost remains a barrier.  This Article argues that sig-
nificant equity, efficiency, and simplicity gains can be realized by con-
solidating substantially similar college tax programs and by increasing 
their coordination with traditional, transfer-based forms of student 
financial assistance. 
ate.  Id. at 11.   Even a community college graduate realizes average lifetime earnings 
that are approximately 25% higher than those of a high school graduate.  Id.
5 BAUM & PAYEA, supra note 3, at 8.  In 2003, 80% of students from families in the 
highest family income quintile, 65% of students from families in the second highest 
quintile, and 61% of students from families from the middle-income quintile en-
rolled in college.  Id.  Only 49% of students from families in the two lowest quintiles 
combined enrolled in college.  Id. 
6 Id.  The enrollment gap between the highest income quintile and the lowest 
income quintile in 2003 was 27%.  Id.
7 Unless otherwise indicated, “low-income” as used in this Article refers to fami-
lies in the two lowest income quintiles during 2005, or families with incomes below 
$36,000.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, 2006 ANNUAL SOCIAL 
AND ECONOMIC SUPPLEMENT Table HINC-05, http://pubdb3.census.gov/macro/ 
032006/hhinc/new05_000.htm. 
8 See infra Parts III.A,  IV.A. 
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The federal higher education spending programs are authorized 
under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA).9  The 
HEA provides financial assistance directly to college students in the 
form of grants, loans and work-study awards.10  These need-based fi-
nancial aid programs are distributed on a progressive basis, with the 
largest subsidies allocated to those students with the least ability to 
pay.11  Targeting subsidies in this manner is not only equitable, but it 
is also efficient, since lower-income students are the most price sensi-
tive and underrepresented socioeconomic cohort in higher educa-
tion.12  By expanding college enrollment across the income spectrum, 
the government facilitates realization of the positive externalities as-
sociated with an educated citizenry by society as a whole.13
Title IV is not without its problems.  Eligibility for Title IV aid is 
determined under a statutorily prescribed formula that assesses the 
income and assets of a family in order to determine their ability to 
pay and their concomitant need for federal student aid.14  However, 
complexity in this needs analysis system and in the financial aid ap-
plication process itself threatens the effectiveness of these programs 
and may present additional enrollment obstacles for low-income stu-
dents.15
As originally enacted, the HEA promised to “give new meaning 
to the phrase ‘equality of opportunity.’”16  That promise has been 
eroded over the past decade as Congress shifted its focus away from 
need-based Title IV aid toward a panoply of new non-need-based 
higher education tax incentives.  These college tax programs can be 
regressive in the distribution of their benefits, providing the largest 
subsidies to higher-income families and little or no subsidy to lower-
income families.17  Such a pattern of distribution is not only inequita-
ble, but also inefficient as a means of distributing educational oppor-
tunities in the American polity.  It also works at cross-purposes with 
9 Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, § 401, 79 Stat. 1219, 1232 
(1965). 
10 Id.
11 See infra Part III.B. 
12 See infra Part II.C.
13 See infra Part II.B. 
14 See infra Part III.B. 
15 Id.
16 Higher Education Act of 1965: Hearings on H.R. 3220 Before the Spec. Subcomm. on 
Educ. of the H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 89th Cong. 26 (1965) [hereinafter Hearings 
on 3220] (statement of Hon. Anthony J. Celebrezze, Sec’y of Health, Educ. & Wel-
fare). 
17 See infra Part IV.B.1. 
RYAN_FINAL 1/7/2008 3:39:07 PM 
4 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1 
the progressive distribution of benefits observed under Title IV.  The 
preferred treatment that these college tax subsidies receive under Ti-
tle IV’s needs analysis system exacerbates their inherent distributional 
inequity.18  In certain circumstances, claiming an education-related 
tax allowance will effectively increase eligibility for Title IV need-
based student aid where such need could not otherwise be demon-
strated.19
Legal scholars have considered the proper treatment of higher 
education expenses under a normatively correct income tax system.20
Others have evaluated the tax benefits for higher education under 
tax and education policy norms.21  Economists have long been inter-
ested in the impact of traditional forms of financial aid on college 
enrollment22 and the incentive effects of the federal needs analysis 
system under Title IV.23  This Article views the federal financial aid 
system as an integrated whole, critically analyzing its individual parts 
and their interaction with each other, and illustrates that the net ef-
fect of the various aid programs is less than the sum of its parts.24
18 See infra Part V. 
19 Id.
20 See, e.g., Loretta Collins Argrett, Tax Treatment of Higher Education Expenditures: 
An Unfair Investment Disincentive, 41 SYRACUSE L. REV. 621 (1990); Charlotte Crane, 
Scholarships and the Federal Income Tax Base, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 63 (1991); David S. 
Davenport, Education and Human Capital: Pursuing an Ideal Income Tax and a Sensible 
Tax Policy, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 793 (1992); Joseph M. Dodge, Taxing Human Capi-
tal Acquisition Costs—Or Why Costs of Higher Education Should Not Be Deducted or Amor-
tized, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 927 (1993). 
21 See, e.g., Ruth Lynch Buchwalter, Should 1 + 1 = 2?  Does the Structure of Federal 
Income Tax Expenditures for Higher Education Disadvantage Women and Low-Income Indi-
viduals?, 22 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 77 (2000); Cynthia E. Garabedian, Tax Breaks for 
Higher Education: Tax Policy or Tax Pandering?, 18 VA. TAX REV. 217 (1998); Eric A. Lus-
tig, Taxation of Prepaid Tuition Plans and the 1997 Tax Provisions—Middle Class Panacea 
or Placebo? Continuing Problems and Variations on a Theme, 31 AKRON L. REV. 229 (1997);
Natasha Mulleneaux, The Failure to Provide Adequate Higher Education Tax Incentives for 
Lower-Income Individuals, 14 AKRON TAX J. 27 (1999); Amy J. Oliver, Improving the Tax 
Code to Provide Meaningful and Effective Tax Incentives for Higher Education, 12 U. FLA.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 91 (2000). 
22 See, e.g., Donald E. Heller, Student Price Response in Higher Education: An Update to 
Leslie and Brinkman, 68 J. OF HIGHER EDUC. 624–59 (1997); Larry L. Leslie & Paul T. 
Brinkman, Student Price Response in Higher Education: The Student Demand Studies, 58 J.
OF HIGHER EDUC. 181 (1987); Michael S. McPherson & Morton O. Schapiro, Does Stu-
dent Aid Affect College Enrollment? New Evidence on a Persistent Controversy, 81 AM. ECON.
REV. 309 (1991). 
23 See, e.g., Andrew W. Dick & Aaron S. Edlin, The Implicit Taxes from College Finan-
cial Aid, 65 J. PUB. ECON. 295 (1997); James Monks, An Empirical Examination of the Im-
pact of College Financial Aid on Family Savings, 57 NAT’L TAX J. 189 (2004). 
24 See ELAINE M. MAAG & KATIE FITZPATRICK, FEDERAL FINANCIAL AID FOR HIGHER 
EDUCATION: PROGRAMS AND PROSPECTS 4 (2004) (arguing that the analysis of the fed-
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While the economic literature has begun to examine the relationship 
between Title IV and the tax benefits for higher education,25 the legal 
literature has left this important subject largely untouched.26
Following this introduction, Part II will describe the history of 
and justification for federal financial assistance for college students, 
including a summary of the economic studies supporting the use of 
financial subsidies to affect enrollments.  Part III will describe the Ti-
tle IV student financial aid programs, including a discussion of the 
complexity endemic to the aid application process and the federal 
needs analysis system.  Part IV will describe the tax benefits for higher 
education and analyze them under the norms of equity, efficiency 
and simplicity.  Part V will describe how the education-related tax 
programs intersect with Title IV under the needs analysis system and 
address the implications of that intersection.  Part VI will illustrate 
the equity, efficiency, and simplicity gains that can be realized by con-
solidating substantially similar tax programs and by coordinating 
them with Title IV under the federal needs analysis. 
II. HISTORY OF AND JUSTIFICATION FOR FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT IN 
HIGHER EDUCATION
A. History27
The federal government’s direct involvement in financing col-
lege students’ education is of relatively recent origin.28  The GI Bill of 
1944 offered returning World War II veterans an unprecedented op-
eral financial assistance programs for college students “needs to proceed in an envi-
ronment that examines the net effects of all the programs, taken together.”). 
25 See, e.g., Leonard E. Burman et. al., The Distributional Consequences of Federal As-
sistance for Higher Education: The Intersection of Tax and Spending Programs (The Urban-
Brookings Tax Policy Center, Discussion Paper No. 26 2005), available at http://www. 
taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/311210_TPC_DiscussionPaper_26.pdf; Susan 
Dynarski, Tax Policy and Education Policy: Collision or Coordination? A Case Study of the 
529 and Coverdell Saving Incentives, in 18 TAX POL’Y & THE ECON. 81, 105 (James M. Po-
terba ed., 2004); Susan Dynarski, Who Benefits from the Education Savings Incentives? In-
come, Educational Expectations and the Value of the 529 and Coverdell, 57 NAT’L TAX J. 359 
(2004) [hereinafter Dynarski, Who Benefits]; Thomas J. Kane, Beyond Tax Relief: Long-
Term Challenges in Financing Higher Education, 50 NAT’L TAX J. 335 (1997); Thomas J. 
Kane, Savings Incentives for Higher Education, 51 NAT’L TAX J. 609 (1998); MAAG &
FITZPATRICK, supra note 24.
26 But see Buchwalter, supra note 21, at 88–89. 
27 See LAWRENCE E. GLADIEUX & ARTHUR M. HAUPTMAN, THE COLLEGE AID 
QUANDARY: ACCESS, QUALITY, AND THE FEDERAL ROLE 14–37 (1995) (providing thor-
ough treatment of history of federal student aid programs). 
28 Id. at 14.   
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portunity to attend college.29  The first real widespread democratiza-
tion in higher education came with the passage of the HEA of 1965.30
Passed during the tenure of President Lyndon B. Johnson, the HEA 
promised to increase access to higher education for qualified stu-
dents by reducing or eliminating financial barriers thereto.31  In pro-
posing the HEA, President Johnson hoped to “give new meaning to 
the phrase ‘equality of opportunity.’”32  The goal of increasing access 
to higher education for economically disadvantaged students was the 
public policy goal supporting this new substantial federal financial 
commitment to higher education. 
The need-based student financial aid programs under Title IV 
came in three forms: grants, loans and work-study programs.33  The 
grant program was designed “to assist in making available the benefits 
of higher education to qualified high school graduates of exceptional 
financial need, who for lack of financial means of their own or of 
their families would be unable to obtain such benefits without such 
aid.”34  The HEA also authorized a federally guaranteed loan pro-
gram that expanded credit opportunities and reduced the cost of 
borrowing for qualified college students.35  The federal work-study 
program subsidized the part-time salaries of eligible college stu-
dents.36
Issues of middle-income affordability have always simmered be-
low the surface of higher education debates.  While Congress con-
templated enacting the HEA, the most substantial federal financial 
commitment to need-based student aid, it also considered several tax 
relief proposals designed to relieve the financial burden of college on 
29 GLADIEUX & HAUPTMAN, supra note 27, at 14. 
30 Id. at 15. 
31 Id.  The HEA of 1965 can be viewed as part of President Johnson’s anti-poverty, 
anti-welfare, Great Society initiatives, which sought to deal with the poverty problem 
by offering poor persons the opportunity to better their station in life through work, 
training and/or education.  See Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The Collision of Tax and Welfare 
Politics: The Political History of the Earned Income Tax Credit, in MAKING WORK PAY: THE 
EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT AND ITS IMPACT ON AMERICA’S FAMILIES, 15, 16–18 (Bruce 
D. Meyer & Douglas Holtz-Eakin eds., 2001). 
32 Hearings on 3220, supra note 16. 
33 See generally Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, § 401, 79 Stat. 
1219, 1232 (1965). 
34 Id. § 401.  These grants were called Educational Opportunity Grants and were 
administered through the institutions rather than being distributed directly to or for 
the benefit of the student as grants under the successor Pell grant program are dis-
tributed today.  Id.
35 See generally id. §§ 421–440.
36 Id. §§ 441–442. 
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middle-income families.37  During the 1965 HEA congressional hear-
ings, several congressman expressed concern about whether the HEA 
programs would do enough for middle-income families, whom one 
Congressman proclaimed to be “the backbone of this country.”38  In 
response, Commissioner of Education Keppel indicated that the first 
order of priority for the federal government was to expand postsec-
ondary educational opportunities for students from lower-income 
families.39  He concluded with the following statement: “I do not wish 
to suggest that all of us are not sympathetic with the problems of mid-
dle-income families . . . .  The problem is what is the wisest public pol-
icy at this time.”40
The concern for “middle income families who pay taxes, but by 
and large are excluded from participation in the student financial aid 
programs” surfaced again during subsequent HEA reauthorization 
hearings.41  In 1978, in order to placate those legislators calling for 
higher education tax benefits to relieve “middle-income squeeze,” 
Congress enacted the Middle Income Student Assistance Act 
(MISAA).42  MISAA expanded need-based grant eligibility into the 
middle-income range and removed financial need as an eligibility re-
quirement for subsidized federally guaranteed student loans.43  Al-
though need was reintroduced as a criteria for receiving subsidized 
student loans in 1981,44 concern for the plight of the politically influ-
ential middle class remained.  During the rest of the 1980s, grant aid 
declined, loan volume grew, and the overall purchasing power of stu-
dent aid began to erode.45  Although legislators voiced concern about 
these trends, they came up with no alternatives as tuition growth at 
37 Hearings on 3220, supra note 16, at 49 (citing Dr. Allen Carter, Tax Relief and the 
Burden of College Costs (1964)).  In the first eight weeks of the 88th session of Con-
gress, more than ninety bills relating to higher education tax relief were sent to 
committee.  Id. 
38 Id. at 419 (question posed by Congressman Reid during statement of Hon. 
Francis Keppel, Comm’r of Educ., and Peter Muirhead, Assoc. Comm’r for Higher 
Educ.). 
39 Id. at 48 (response made by Hon. Francis Keppel, Comm’r of Educ., during 
statement of Hon. Anthony J. Celebrezze, Sec’y of Health, Educ. & Welfare).
40 Id.
41 Higher Education Amendments of 1971: Hearings on H.R. 32, H.R. 5191, H.R. 5192, 
H.R. 5193, and H.R. 7248 Before the Subcomm. on Educ. of the H. Comm. on Educ. and La-
bor, 92d Cong. 81 (1971) (opening remarks of Hon. Edith Green, chairman of the 
special subcommittee). 
42 GLADIEUX & HAUPTMAN, supra note 27, at 17. 
43 ARTHUR M. HAUPTMAN & ROBERT H. KOFF, NEW WAYS OF PAYING FOR COLLEGE 36 
(1991). 
44 Id. at 18. 
45 Id.
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both public and private institutions continued to outpace inflation 
and the growth in median family incomes.46
In the 1992 reauthorization of the HEA, Congress chose to ad-
dress the needs of the middle class in two important ways.  First, it 
expanded borrowing opportunities by creating a new federally guar-
anteed unsubsidized47 student loan option and a parental loan op-
tion, both of which were available to all students (or their parents), 
regardless of financial need.48  Second, it instituted a new federal 
formula for determining financial need under Title IV called the fed-
eral methodology (FM), which is still utilized today.49  The corner-
stone of the FM is the calculation of the expected family contribution 
(EFC).  The EFC is the amount that the federal government expects a 
family to contribute towards a student’s higher education expenses 
before any need-based federal financial aid becomes available.  Un-
der the 1992 reauthorization, home equity and retirement accounts 
were statutorily excluded as assets available to pay for college.  As a 
result of these changes, eligibility of middle-income families for Title 
IV financial aid increased with no corresponding reduction in net 
worth or standard of living.  Consequently, the pool of students eligi-
ble for federal financial aid expanded with no commensurate in-
crease in federal funding.  As a result, financial aid per student fell 
and the beneficiaries of need-based aid expanded into middle and 
upper income range. 
Still not satisfied with the level of middle-class college subsidies 
and concerned with the overall tax burden on the middle class,50
President William J. Clinton proposed and Congress enacted a pack-
age of new tax incentives for higher education in the Taxpayer Relief 
Act of 1997 (TRA).51  Prior to 1997, outside of the employment con-
text,52 the tax benefits for higher education available to students 
46 Id.
47 “Unsubsidized” in the sense that the federal government did not provide an in-
school interest subsidy.  GLADIEUX & HAUPTMAN, supra note 27, at 19. 
48 Id.
49 Id; see also SANDY BAUM, COLLEGE BOARD, A PRIMER ON ECONOMICS FOR FINANCIAL 
AID PROFESSIONALS 3 (2004), available at http://www.collegeboard.com/prod_down 
loads/highered/fa/Economics-Primer-2004.pdf (noting that this was actually the 
“second iteration of the congressional attempt to legislate a need analysis system, the 
Congressional Methodology (CM) having been in effect from 1988 through 1992.”). 
50 See Statement by President William J. Clinton Upon Signing H.R. 2014, as re-
printed in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1620-1 [hereinafter Statement by President Clinton]. 
51 Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788 (1997).
52 Within the employment context, there is a deduction for employment-related 
educational costs.  I.R.C. § 162 (2000).  This section applies if the education main-
tained or improved a skill required in the taxpayer’s current trade or business, if the 
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and/or their parents were somewhat limited and included only: (1) 
an exclusion for qualified scholarships;53 (2) a parental dependency 
exemption for students aged nineteen to twenty-three;54 (3) an exclu-
sion for interest earned on certain qualified savings bonds used to 
pay qualified higher education costs;55 (4) relief from discharge of 
indebtedness income on the forgiveness of certain student loans;56
and (5) an exclusion for earnings on qualified state tuition pro-
grams.57  The new education-related tax provisions introduced by the 
TRA included two tuition tax credits,58 a deduction for interest paid 
on qualified educational loans,59 a new tax-favored savings vehicle for 
higher education,60 and a provision allowing penalty-free withdrawals 
from individual retirement accounts for payment of higher education 
expenses.61  Subsequently, the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Rec-
onciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA)62 introduced a new deduction for 
higher education expenses63 and expanded the tax benefits provided 
by the student loan interest deduction and the higher education sav-
ings incentives.  More recently, the Pension Protection Act of 200664
made certain of the temporary education-related savings incentives 
passed under EGTRRA permanent.65
education met the express requirement of taxpayer’s employer or an applicable law, 
or was imposed as a condition of continued employment.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 
(1967).  In addition, there is an exclusion for employer-provided educational assis-
tance.  I.R.C. § 127 (2000).   See generally STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH 
CONG., PRESENT LAW AND ANALYSIS RELATING TO TAX BENEFITS FOR HIGHER EDUCATION 
(2004), available at http://www.house.gov/jct/x-52-04.pdf. 
53 I.R.C. § 117 (2000).
54 Id. § 152(c)(3)(A)(ii). 
55 Id. § 135. 
56 Id. § 108(f). 
57 Id. § 529.
58 Id. § 25A. 
59 I.R.C. § 221.
60 Id. § 530. 
61 Id. § 72 (t)(2)(E). 
62 Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-
16, 115 Stat. 38 (2001). 
63 I.R.C. § 222 (2000 Supp. I). 
64 Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (2006).
65 Id. § 1304. 
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According to President Clinton, the educational purpose66 of the 
TRA higher education tax initiatives was to make “[two] years of col-
lege universally available and . . . make the third and fourth years of 
college more affordable . . . [and] to help families save for higher 
education.”67  It is interesting to note the formal introduction of af-
fordability as a policy goal supporting these new non-need-based fed-
eral higher education tax initiatives.  Prior to 1997, access was the sine 
qua non of federal higher education policy, and the federal govern-
ment pursued this policy goal through the need-based financial aid 
programs under Title IV of the HEA. 
B. Justification: Private and Public Benefits of Higher Education 
Why is the federal government involved at all in higher educa-
tion financing?  There are both private and public benefits associated 
with postsecondary educational attainment.68  College graduates earn 
a high rate of return on their investment in the form of increased 
lifetime earnings.69  Over the course of a forty-year career, a four-year 
college graduate can expect to earn 73% more in wages than the av-
erage high school graduate.70  Even a community college graduate 
realizes average lifetime earnings that are approximately 25% higher 
than those of a high school graduate.71  The equality of opportunity 
rationale first espoused by President Johnson also supports govern-
ment subsidies for higher education for low-income students to en-
sure access to these increased earnings opportunities for those most 
in need.72  Indeed, advanced educational attainment may be one 
means to reduce income inequality and poverty.73
Not only does increased participation in higher education re-
ward the individual student, but society as a whole reaps many re-
66 The TRA higher education tax incentives were designed not only to further 
educational goals, but also to provide tax relief to the middle class.  See Statement by 
President Clinton, supra note 50; THOMAS J. KANE, THE PRICE OF ADMISSION: RETHINKING 
HOW AMERICANS PAY FOR COLLEGE 45 (1999), available at
http://brookings.nap.edu/books/0815750137/html/index.html (arguing that these 
provisions are tax relief not educational policy). 
67 Statement by President Clinton, supra note 50. 
68 EDUCATION PAYS 2004, supra note 4, at 7. 
69 Id. at 9. 
70 Id. at 11. 
71 Id.
72 PAMELA J. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, HIGHER EDUCATION TAX CREDITS:
TEST AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 4 (2006), available at http://www.opencrs.com/rpts/ 
RL32507_20060117.pdf. 
73 Id.
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wards from an educated citizenry.74  These societal benefits in excess 
of private returns to higher education, or positive externalities, in-
clude lower levels of unemployment,75 poverty,76 and crime;77 in-
creased productivity;78 technological advancement;79 tax revenues;80
civic participation;81 and reduced reliance on social safety nets.82  The 
individual student may not factor these societal benefits in deciding 
whether to attend college.  As a result, absent a subsidy, under-
investment in higher education may occur.83  Accordingly, the goal of 
government college subsidies is to stimulate private demand in order 
to attain more optimal levels of education.84  According to a report by 
the Advisory Committee on Student Financial Assistance, an inde-
pendent committee created by Congress to advise on student aid pol-
icy, “[r]ecent estimates suggest that if the 32-percentage point gap in 
the college-going rates of the highest and lowest income Americans 
were narrowed significantly, we would add nearly $250 billion to the 
gross domestic product and $80 billion in taxes.”85
C. Prices, Aid, and Enrollment 
The federal government uses financial subsidies as its policy in-
strument of choice to induce increased college attendance.  This ap-
proach is supported by economic studies that illustrate the inverse re-
lationship between cost and enrollment, although the magnitude of 
this relationship varies.  A well-known 1987 article by Larry Leslie and 
Paul Brinkman reviewed and standardized the results of the existing 
economic studies analyzing the effect of price increases on college 
74 EDUCATION PAYS 2004, supra note 4, at 9. 
75 Id. at 16 fig. 7 (noting that “[f]or all racial/ethnic groups, the unemployment 
rate falls as education level increases.”).
76 Id. at 17.  The poverty rate for college graduates is approximately one-third of 
the poverty rate for high school graduates.  Id. 
77 Id. at 20.  Incarceration rates decrease as education level increases.  Id. 
78 JACKSON, supra note 72, at 2. 
79 MAAG & FITZPATRICK, supra note 24, at 8. 
80 EDUCATION PAYS 2004, supra note 4, at 10.  The average college graduate work-
ing full-time pays over 100% more in federal income taxes than the average high 
school graduate.  Id. 
81 Id. at 23.  In every age group, higher education levels correlate with higher vot-
ing rates.  Id. 
82 MAAG & FITZPATRICK, supra note 24, at 8. 
83 Id. 
84 JACKSON, supra note 72, at 2. 
85 ADVISORY COMM. ON STUDENT FIN. ASSISTANCE, 107TH CONG., ACCESS DENIED:
RESTORING THE NATION’S COMMITMENT TO EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 2 
(2001), available at http://www.ed.gov/about/bdscomm/list/acsfa/access_denied. 
pdf [herinafter ACCESS DENIED]. 
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entry.  The authors found that the mean response to a $100 increase 
in tuition was a .7% drop in college enrollment.86  Thomas Kane con-
verted the Leslie and Brinkman finding into a more standardized 
format, translating their result as a 5% decrease in college enroll-
ment for every $1,000 increase in annual tuition costs.87  More re-
cently, Susan Dynarski estimated that an increase of $1,000 in grant 
aid, which equates to a $1,000 decrease in net price, increased the 
probability of attending college by about 3.6%.88
A contrary and controversial 1983 time series study by W.L. Han-
sen found that the availability of grant aid failed to increase access for 
low-income students.89  In a later study in the early 1990s, Michael 
McPherson and Morton Schapiro attempted to reconcile the discrep-
ancies in the student demand literature.90  Using an econometric 
analysis of time-series data, the authors demonstrated that “increases 
in net cost over time lead to decreases in enrollment rates for lower-
income students.”91  An important companion finding was that in-
creases in net cost had no effect on the enrollment patterns of 
wealthier students.92  A later study by Kane buttressed the McPherson 
and Schapiro findings.93  Kane estimated that a $1,000 difference in 
public two-year tuition resulted in a 4.5% decrease in enrollment, 
while the same price reduction in public four-year tuition resulted in 
only .8% decline in enrollment.94  Since low-income students are dis-
proportionately represented in two-year public colleges, this finding 
supported the conclusion that lower-income students are more sensi-
tive to price in making the college enrollment decision than their 
wealthier peers.95
86 Leslie & Brinkman, supra note 22, at 188–89 (calculated in 1982–83 dollars). 
87 KANE, supra note 66, at 114. 
88 See generally Susan Dynarski, Does Aid Matter? Measuring the Effect of Student Aid on 
College Attendance and Completion, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 279 (2003).  Dynarski’s conclu-
sion is based on an analysis of the effect that the elimination of the Social Security 
student benefit program in 1982 had on college attendance.  Id. 
89 W.L. Hansen, Impact of Student Financial Aid on Access, in THE CRISIS IN HIGHER 
EDUCATION 84–96 (Joseph Froomkin ed., 1983). 
90 MICHAEL S. MCPHERSON & MORTON OWEN SCHAPIRO, THE STUDENT AID GAME:
MEETING NEED AND REWARDING TALENT IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION  (1998). 
91 Id. at 39 (finding that a $150 net cost increase (in 1993-94 dollars) resulted in a 
1.6% decrease in enrollment levels for students from families with incomes below 
$20,000). 
92 Id.
93 KANE, supra note 66, at 105. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 106 (“low-income” included the bottom 40% of the family incomes in the 
study). 
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Over the past decade, college tuition increases outpaced both 
inflation and the growth in median family income.  Tuition and fees 
at public and private four-year colleges rose an average of 4.2% and 
2.8% per year, respectively, in inflation-adjusted dollars.96  Even after 
accounting for grant aid, average net prices at public and private 
four-year colleges rose an average of 2.7% and 2.4% per year, respec-
tively, in inflation-adjusted dollars.97  While tuition and fees at public 
four-year institutions grew in total by an inflation-adjusted 52% over 
the past decade, median family income grew by only 3% during the 
same time period.98
Given the studies on the effect of price on enrollment, the in-
crease in net tuition paid by college students over the past decade 
should have caused enrollments to decline.  Surprisingly, college en-
rollment rates actually increased during this period.99  In 1990, only 
39% of the population entered college.100  By 2000, over 50% of the 
population pursued some form of postsecondary education.101  One 
reason for the failure of tuition increases to slow enrollment is the in-
creased financial returns associated with higher education.102  These 
enrollment increases and the associated earnings premiums, how-
ever, have not been shared equally among income groups.  Low-
income students still lag behind their more affluent peers in postsec-
ondary educational attainment.  In 2003, 80% of students from fami-
lies in the highest family income quintile, 65% of students from fami-
lies in the second highest income quintile, and 61% of students from 
families from the middle-income quintile enrolled in college.103  In 
contrast, only 49% of students from families in the two lowest income 
quintiles combined enrolled in college.104
96 COLLEGE BOARD, TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING 10 (2006), available at 
http://www.collegeboard.com/prod_downloads/press/cost06/trends_college_prici
ng_06.pdf [hereinafter TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING 2006].  At public two-year col-
leges, the equivalent average increase in tuition and fees was 1.8% per year.  Id. 
97 Id. at 15–16.  Net price is defined as the published price less the average grant 
aid from all sources and the amount of any education tax benefits (education-related 
credit or deduction only) per full-time student.  Id.  Interestingly, over the past dec-
ade, average net tuition and fees at public two-year colleges have declined by about 
$600 in constant 2006 dollars.  Id. at 17. 
98 TRENDS IN STUDENT AID 2006, supra note 2, at 23 (author’s own calculation in 
constant 2005 dollars). 
99 BAUM & PAYEA, supra note 3, at 3 fig. 2b. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 See supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text. 
103 BAUM & PAYEA, supra note 3, at 8 (figures represent 2003 high school graduates 
who enrolled in college immediately after high school). 
104 Id.
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In combination, the student demand studies and the actual data 
on enrollment suggest that to effectively increase college enrollment, 
financial subsidies should be targeted to the most price-sensitive and 
underrepresented socioeconomic group in higher education, 
namely, lower-income students.  Title IV of the HEA attempts, albeit 
imperfectly, to target student financial aid in exactly this manner. 
III. TITLE IV OF THE HEA 
A. Description of Programs 
The three-pronged approach under Title IV of the HEA to fed-
eral student aid (grants, loans and work-study) remains largely intact 
today, although the composition has changed over time.  During the 
2004–2005 academic year, the federal government distributed ap-
proximately $83 billion in Title IV financial aid to college students.105
The two largest programs under Title IV are the federal Pell grant 
program and the federally guaranteed student loan programs. 
The Pell grant106 program accounted for approximately $13 bil-
lion of the total Title IV financial aid distributed during the 2004–
2005 academic year.107 The Pell grant program is the largest federal 
need-based grant program and the only pure subsidy under Title 
IV.108  It is also the most progressive federal student aid program, with 
84% of the funds distributed to dependent undergraduate students 
with family incomes below $40,000.109  Individual grants for the 2004–
2005 academic year ranged from $400–$4,050.110  Although the 
maximum Pell grant award increased between academic years 2001–
2002 to 2005–2006, its purchasing power fell.  During this period, the 
105 TRENDS IN STUDENT AID 2006, supra note 2, at 6 tbl. 1.  This includes Title IV aid 
to both undergraduate and graduate students.  Id. 
106 The Pell Grant was so named in honor of former Senator Claiborne Pell of 
Rhode Island.  TERRY W. HARTLE ET AL., AM. COUNCIL ON EDUC., WHAT EVERY STUDENT 
SHOULD KNOW ABOUT FEDERAL AID 7 (2005), http://www.acenet.edu/bookstore/ 
pdf/2005paying4college.pdf. 
107 TRENDS IN STUDENT AID 2006, supra note 2, at 6 tbl. 1 (in current 2005–2006 
dollars). 
108 This is in contrast to loans, which must be repaid, and work-study dollars, 
which the student must work to earn. 
109 LUTZ BERKNER ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., 2003–04 NAT’L 
POSTSECONDARY STUDENT AID STUDY (NPSAS:04) STUDENT FINANCIAL AID ESTIMATES 
FOR 2003-04 (NCES 2005-158) 6 (2005), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2005/2005163.pdf 
(hereinafter STUDENT FINANCIAL AID ESTIMATES).
110 TRENDS IN STUDENT AID 2006, supra note 2, at 17 tbl. 8b. 
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average cost of attendance at a public four-year institution covered by 
a Pell grant declined from 42% to 33%.111
Federally guaranteed student loans accounted for approximately 
$63 billion of the total Title IV aid distributed during the 2004–2005 
academic year.112  This total includes loans distributed on the basis of 
demonstrated financial need, including Perkins113 and subsidized 
Stafford114 loans, and loans available to all students regardless of 
need, including unsubsidized Stafford and Parent Loans for Under-
graduate Students (“PLUS loans”).115  Generally, federal student 
loans enjoy a lower-than-market interest rate because of the federal 
guarantee.116  In addition, the government pays interest on need-
based loans while the student remains in college.  Dynarski estimated
that the subsidy value of a subsidized Stafford loan was 30% of the 
face amount of the loan while the subsidy value of an unsubsidized 
Stafford loan was only 15% of the loan amount.117
B. Federal Methodology 
Student eligibility for the Pell grant and subsidized loan pro-
grams under Title IV is determined on the basis of financial need.118
The statutorily prescribed formula under Title IV for determining 
111 Id. at 17. 
112 Id. at 6 tbl. 1. 
113 Perkins loans are distributed through the financial aid offices of participating 
colleges and universities.  HARTLE ET AL., supra note 106, at 8. 
114 Stafford loans are low-interest loans distributed directly to college students.  Id.
at 9. 
115 PLUS loans are distributed to the parents of dependent undergraduate stu-
dents.  Parental borrowers must have sufficiently good credit to qualify for a PLUS 
loan.  See Federal Student Aid, Plus Loans, http://studentaid.ed.gov/PORTALS 
WebApp/students/english/parentloans.jsp?tab=funding (last visited Sept. 26, 2007). 
116 The interest rate on Perkins loans is 5%.  20 U.S.C.A. § 1087dd(c)(1)(D) 
(West 2006).  For Stafford loans made after July 1, 1994 and prior to July 1, 2006, the 
interest rate was a variable rate adjusted every July 1, with an interest rate cap of 
8.25%.  Id. §§ 1077a(f)–(k), 1087e(b)(1)–(7).  For Stafford loans made on or after 
July 1, 2006, the rate converts to a fixed 6.8%.  Id. §§ 1077a(l)(1), 1087e(b)(7)(A).  
For PLUS loans made after July 1, 1998 and before July 1, 2006, the interest rate was 
a variable rate adjusted every July 1 with a 9% cap on interest.  Id. §§ 1077a(k)(3), 
1087e(b)(4).  The interest rate on PLUS Loans disbursed on or after July 1, 2006 
made under the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan (Direct Loan) Program is fixed 
at 7.90%.  Id. § 1087e(b)(7)(B).  The interest rate on PLUS loans disbursed on or 
after July 1, 2006 made under the Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL) program is 
fixed at 8.5%.  Id. § 1077a(l)(2).
117 Susan Dynarski, Loans, Liquidity and Schooling Decisions 4–5 (Joint Ctr. for Pov-
erty Research, Northwestern Univ./Univ. of Chicago Working Paper Series, JCPR 
Working Paper No. 346, 2003), available at http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~S 
Dynarski/Dynarski_loans.pdf.
118 MCPHERSON & SCHAPIRO, supra note 90, at 11–12.
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need is called the federal methodology (FM).119  This federal needs 
analysis system can be reduced to a deceptively simple formula under 
which need equals the cost of attendance (COA) less the expected 
family contribution (EFC).120  COA includes an allowance for tuition, 
fees, books, supplies, room, board, transportation, etc.121  EFC is the 
amount that the federal government expects a family to contribute 
toward college costs before any federal financial assistance becomes 
available.122  It attempts to measure a family’s ability to pay postsec-
ondary education expenses out of the family’s own resources. 
A few general observations about the FM should be made before 
exploring the details.  First, no student can qualify for financial aid in 
excess of the total cost to attend a given institution.  Second, a stu-
dent whose EFC exceeds the COA at a given institution will have no 
financial need and consequently will not qualify for any need-based 
aid.  Third, at any given COA, a family with a higher EFC will qualify 
for less financial aid than a family with a lower EFC.  Finally, at any 
given EFC, a student applying to a more expensive school will dem-
onstrate more need and consequently qualify for more financial aid 
than a student applying to a less expensive school.  Overall, the goal 
of the FM is to distribute federal financial aid progressively based on 
need. 
There are three basic statutorily prescribed formulas used to cal-
culate the EFC, depending on whether the student is a dependent 
student, an independent student with no dependents other than a 
spouse, or an independent student with non-spouse dependents.123  A 
dependent student’s EFC is the sum of a parental contribution from 
income and assets and a student contribution from income and as-
119 BAUM, supra note 49, at 3.  This can be compared to the institutional method-
ology, which individual schools use to distribute non-federal financial aid to their 
students.  Id. 
120 20 U.S.C. § 1087kk (2000). 
121 Id. § 1087ll.   The institutions provide this variable in the formula. 
122 Id. § 1087mm. 
123 Id. §§ 1087oo–1087qq.  A student is independent for purposes of the federal 
methodology if he or she: (1) is twenty-four years of age or older by December 31 of 
the award year; (2) is an orphan or ward of the court or was a ward of the court until 
age eighteen; (3) is a veteran of the U.S. armed forces; (4) is a graduate or profes-
sional student; (5) is married; (6) has legal dependents other than a spouse; or (7) is 
designated as independent by a financial aid administrator.  Id. § 1087vv(d).  See also
2006–2007 FEDERAL STUDENT AID HANDBOOK, APPLICATION AND VERIFICATION GUIDE 22 
[hereinafter FSA HANDBOOK], available at http://ifap.ed.gov/sfahandbooks/ 
attachments/0607AVG.pdf.  As of 2006, those serving on active duty in the armed 
forces are also treated as independent students.  Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. 
L. No. 109-171, § 8019, 120 Stat. 4, 176 (2006). 
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sets.124  The first step in calculating the parents’ contribution is to de-
termine the parents’ income available to be put towards the child’s 
education, or their “available income.”125  “Available income” is equal 
to the parents’ “total income” less certain allowances including, inter 
alia, an allowance for federal taxes and an income protection allow-
ance.126  “Total income” is defined as the parents’ adjusted gross in-
come (AGI)127 plus some items of untaxed income and benefits, mi-
nus some items of excludable income.128  In the 2006–2007 academic 
year, the income protection allowance for a family of four with one 
student in college protects up to $22,200 in after-tax income from as-
sessment under the FM.129
A parental contribution from assets is then added to “available 
income.”130  For many middle-income families, however, the parental 
asset contribution is increasingly irrelevant because home equity and 
retirement accounts are excluded from consideration as assets avail-
able to be put towards a student’s higher education expenses.131  In-
cludable assets now are limited to cash accounts, the net worth of in-
vestments held outside of retirement plans, and the adjusted value of 
farm and business assets.132  The value of includable parental assets is 
offset by an asset protection allowance that varies by the age of the 
124 20 U.S.C. § 1087oo(a)–(b) (2000). 
125 Id. § 1087oo(b).  This Article is focused mainly on dependent undergraduate 
students.  The plight of independent and graduate students is beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
126 Id. § 1087oo(c). 
127 AGI is gross income (income from all sources per I.R.C. § 61 (2000)) less cer-
tain deductions allowed to all taxpayers regardless of whether they itemize or not.  
See I.R.C. § 62 (2000). 
128 20 U.S.C. § 1087vv(a)(1) (2000).  Untaxed income and benefits include, inter 
alia, (1) child support; (2) certain welfare benefits; (3) workman’s compensation; (4) 
certain veterans’ benefits; (5) tax-exempt interest; (6) earned income tax credit; (7) 
untaxed portion of pensions; and (8) payments to individual retirement accounts 
and Keogh accounts excluded from income for Federal income tax purposes.  Id. § 
1087vv (b)(2000); see id. § 1087vv(e) (defining excludable income). 
129 FSA HANDBOOK, supra note 123, at 56 tbl. A3 (providing updated inflation-
adjusted amounts). 
130 20 U.S.C. § 1087oo(b)(1)(B) (2000). 
131 KANE, supra note 66, at 23–24 (this includes pension, 401(k), and IRA account 
balances). 
132 20 U.S.C. § 1087oo(d)(2) (2000).  The net worth of farm and business assets is 
adjusted to protect a portion of these assets from assessment under the EFC formula.   
See FSA HANDBOOK, supra note 123, at 56 tbl. A4 (providing updated inflation-
adjustment amounts).  Under changes made by HERA 2005, the net worth of a fam-
ily-owned and controlled small business is now excluded from consideration under 
the EFC formula. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 8019, 120 
Stat. 4, 176 (2006). 
RYAN_FINAL 1/7/2008 3:39:07 PM 
18 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1 
older parent and the number of parents in the household.133  In 
2006, a two-parent household where the older parent is age forty-five, 
could protect up to $44,300 in includable assets before any such as-
sets would be assessed by the FM.134  The value of includable assets 
over the asset protection allowance is multiplied by 12%, with the re-
sulting sum representing the parents required contribution from 
their assets.135
The sum of the parents’ “available income” is added to their 
contribution from assets to arrive at an intermediate sum called “ad-
justed available income.”136  The parental “adjusted available income” 
is subjected to a progressive marginal rate schedule that ranges from 
22% to 47% to arrive at the total parental contribution to the stu-
dent’s EFC.137  Stated another way, the financial aid system expects a 
dependent student’s parents annually to contribute a maximum of 
47% of their total income and 5.64% of their includable assets over 
the respective allowances towards their child’s postsecondary ex-
penses.138  The parental contribution is further adjusted if there are 
multiple children in college at the same time.139  Under these circum-
stances, the total parental contribution is divided by the number of 
students in college.140
The income and assets of the student are assessed by the FM in a 
similar manner.  However, the EFC formula expects the student to 
contribute more of his or her own resources towards college than is 
expected of the student’s parents.  The student’s available income is 
assessed at a flat rate of 50%.141  Furthermore, the student’s assets are 
133 20 U.S.C. § 1087oo(d)(1)(B), (d)(3) (2000). The allowances for ages 40 
through 65 are set to approximate the present cost of an annuity which, when com-
bined with Social Security benefits, would provide at age sixty-five a moderate income 
for a retired couple or single person.  FSA HANDBOOK, supra note 123, at 39; see id. at 
57 tbl. A5 (for updated asset protection allowance table). 
134 Id. at 57 tbl. A5. 
135 20 U.S.C. § 1087oo(d)(1)(C), (d)(4) (2000). 
136 Id. § 1087oo(b)(1). 
137 FSA HANDBOOK, supra note 123, at 57 tbl. 6.  The maximum rate of 47% is 
reached when the parents’ adjusted available income is $26,101 or more.  Id. 
138 The 5.64% is arrived at by multiplying 12% (the percentage of includable as-
sets included in adjusted available income) by the maximum marginal rate on ad-
justed available income of 47%. 
139 20 U.S.C. § 1087oo(b)(3) (2000). 
140 Id.
141 Id. § 1087oo(g)(5).  Available income of the student is total income less certain 
allowances, including, inter alia, an allowance for federal income taxes and an in-
come protection allowance.  Id. § 1087oo(g)(1)(A)–(B), (g)(2).  Prior to HERA 
2005, the income protection allowance was $2,200 (indexed for inflation).  Id. § 
1087oo(g)(2)(D).  HERA 2005 increased the student’s income protection allowance 
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assessed at an annual flat rate of 35%.142  Under changes made by the 
Higher Education Reconciliation Act of 2005 (HERA 2005), begin-
ning with the 2007–2008 academic year, the annual assessment rate 
for student-owned assets will be reduced to 20%.143  The total EFC is 
the sum of the parental income and asset contribution and the stu-
dent income and asset contribution.144
For certain lower-income families, there is a simplified EFC for-
mula available that considers only the income and not the assets of 
the family as resources available to be put towards paying college 
costs.  In 2006, a dependent student qualified for the simplified for-
mula if two requirements were met: (1) neither the student nor the 
parents were required to file an IRS Form 1040, except in order to 
claim an education tax credit and (2) the parents’ combined AGI was 
less than $50,000.145  For the very poorest families where the parents’ 
AGI is $20,000 or less, an automatic zero EFC is assigned to the de-
pendent student.146
The EFC is calculated by the U.S. Department of Education 
(DOE) on the basis of financial and other information submitted by 
the student on his or her Free Application for Federal Student Aid 
(FAFSA).147  To be eligible for any federal student aid (except paren-
tal PLUS loans), the student must have completed a FAFSA in the 
to $3,000 in 2006.  Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 
8017(a)(1)(A), 120 Stat. 4, 173–74 (2006). 
142 20 U.S.C. § 1087oo(h) (2000).  There is no asset protection allowance available 
for the student.  FSA HANDBOOK, supra note 123, at 40.
143 Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 8017(a)(1)(B), 120 Stat. 
4, 173–74 (2006). 
144 20 U.S.C. § 1087oo(a) (2000). 
145 FSA HANDBOOK, supra note 123, at 35. If the parents were not required to file a 
tax return, income earned from work is substituted for AGI in determining whether 
the student qualifies for the simplified formula.  Id.  Under HERA 2005, a student 
may qualify for the simplified-needs EFC if, in addition to meeting the relevant in-
come criteria, the student (or spouse), or the dependent student’s parent(s), re-
ceived benefits from a means-tested Federal benefit program.  Deficit Reduction Act 
of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 8018(a)(1)(A), 120 Stat. 4, 174 (2006). According to 
the Department of Education, the receipt of a Federal means-tested benefit does not 
make a student automatically eligible for the simplified needs test; it is simply an al-
ternative to the tax return filing standard.  Letter GEN-06-10 from James Manning, 
Assistant Secretary for Postsecondary Education, and Theresa S. Shaw, COO Fed. 
Student Aid, to Colleagues (June 20, 2006), available at http://www.ifap.ed.gov 
/dpcletters/GEN0610.html.  The income criteria must also be met.  Id.
146 Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 8018(a)(2)(B), 120 Stat. 
4, 174 (2006). 
147 See Susan M. Dynarski & Judith E. Scott-Clayton, The Cost of Complexity in Federal 
Student Aid: Lessons from Optimal Tax Theory and Behavioral Economics, 59 NAT’L TAX J. 
319, 321–23 (2006) (describing the federal student aid application process in textual 
and graphic formats). 
RYAN_FINAL 1/7/2008 3:39:07 PM 
20 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1 
year preceding the intended award year.148  A FAFSA or renewal 
FAFSA must be filed anew each year in order to qualify for federal aid 
for the next academic year.  After receiving a completed FAFSA, the 
DOE will process the information and send the student a Student Aid 
Report (SAR), which contains the student’s calculated EFC.149  The 
DOE will also send the information contained in the SAR to those 
colleges the student listed on his or her financial aid application 
form.150  The colleges and universities will then use the EFC to con-
struct a financial aid package consisting of federal, state and institu-
tional aid.151  A prospective freshman cannot apply for federal finan-
cial aid until January of his or her last year in high school because 
many of the FAFSA questions require financial information from the 
immediately preceding calendar year.152  This same potential college 
student does not receive a financial aid package until March or April 
of the senior year of high school.153  Although some select colleges 
and universities are committed to satisfying 100% of a student’s need 
via financial aid, most schools leave a financial aid gap (difference be-
tween calculated financial need and the COA at a particular institu-
tion).154
Susan Dynarski and Judith Scott-Clayton criticized the complex-
ity in this financial aid application process.155  Completing the FAFSA 
is an extraordinarily complex and time consuming undertaking.156
The FAFSA is longer in length and asks more questions than an IRS 
Form 1040.157  The goal of the FAFSA is to elicit sufficient informa-
tion to create a precise financial snapshot of the family’s ability to pay 
for college and concomitant need for aid.  As argued by Dynarski and 
Scott-Clayton, however, there is a trade-off between precision and 
148 FSA HANDBOOK, supra note 123, at 3.  The FAFSA is the only form that a stu-
dent must complete for Title IV federal aid.  However, the individual institutions may 
require additional information for purposes of determining qualification for institu-
tional aid.  Id.
149 Dynarski & Scott-Clayton, supra note 147, at 322 fig. 1; see also FSA HANDBOOK, 
supra note 123, at 6.
150 The report sent to the schools listed on the FAFSA is called the Institutional 
Student Information Record.  Id.
151 See HARTLE ET AL., supra note 106, at 11. 
152 Dynarski & Scott-Clayton, supra note 147, at 323. 
153 Id. (arguing that this may be too late to affect the college-going decisions of 
students who are most sensitive to net price, or lower-income students). 
154 HARTLE ET AL., supra note 106, at 6 (calling this the level of “unmet need”). 
155 Dynarski & Scott-Clayton, supra note 147, at 319. 
156 Id. at 323 tbl. 1 (comparing 2006–2007 FAFSA with IRS Forms 1040, 1040A, 
and 1040 EZ).
157 Id.  (although the official estimates of time to prepare are less for the FAFSA 
than any of the tax forms). 
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complexity.158  Using optimal tax theory and behavioral economics, 
the authors argue that provisions designed to more precisely target 
aid to the neediest students create complexity and result in regressive 
compliance costs.159  These compliance costs are disproportionately 
borne by exactly those lower-income families they are intended to 
help.160  The study also demonstrated that although the costs of com-
plexity were large, the benefits were small because much of the in-
formation elicited on the FAFSA failed to improve the targeting of 
aid.161  By using only parents’ AGI, marital status, family size, and the 
number of children in college plus a few more variables, the authors 
were able to capture 90% of the variation in Pell grant awards.162
IV. TAX EXPENDITURES FOR HIGHER EDUCATION
The goal of Title IV remains increasing access to higher educa-
tion by removing financial barriers thereto.  The FM attempts to de-
termine precisely the amount of unmet need faced by a student in at-
tending the college of his or her choice.  Need-based Title IV funds 
are then distributed progressively, with the poorest students receiving 
the largest amount of financial aid.  The Title IV need-based aid sys-
tem is quite effective from a distributional standpoint, with 84% of 
the Pell grant funds awarded to families with incomes below 
$40,000.163  This distribution of college aid is the one most likely to 
affect access.164
The tax benefits for higher education, on the other hand, are 
non-need-based higher education subsidies in the form of tax expen-
ditures rather than transfer payments.165  “Tax expenditure,” as used 
in this Article, refers only to those tax allowances that are specifically 
enacted by Congress as subsidies to encourage taxpayers to engage in 
a socially desirable activity.  In other words, the tax system is simply 
the mechanism through which the federal dollars are distributed with 
158 Id. at 321. 
159 Id. at 320. 
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.  Dynarski and Scott-Clayton also argued that the time lag between filing the 
FAFSA and actually receiving information about the amount and type of aid awarded 
also potentially blunts the enrollment impact of Title IV aid.  Id. at 320–21.  The au-
thors argue that providing financial aid information to the student in the spring of 
the student’s final year in high school is too late for the subsidy to affect behavior.  
Id.
163 BERKNER ET AL., supra note 109.
164 See supra Part II.C.
165 See supra notes 58–63 and accompanying text (for listing of tax benefits for 
higher education). 
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regard to the particular activity.  With regard to these types of tax ex-
penditures, Congress alternatively could have enacted a direct spend-
ing program or expanded an existing spending program to induce 
participation in the desired activity.  Viewed in this light, the tax ex-
penditures for higher education are college spending programs im-
plemented through the tax system.  However, there are equity, effi-
ciency and complexity implications to placing these spending 
programs in the tax system rather than distributing an equivalent 
amount of federal higher education dollars through existing Title IV 
spending programs. 
In 2005, the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimated that 
the tax expenditures for higher education that assist students in pay-
ing for college would cost the federal government $8.6 billion, with 
the total foregone revenue broken down by program as follows: (1) 
Hope Scholarship Credit/Lifetime Learning Credit: $5.2 billion; (2) 
deduction for qualified tuition and related expenses: $2.8 billion; (3) 
exclusion of earnings on Coverdell education savings accounts: $.1 
billion; and (4) exclusion of earnings on qualified tuition programs: 
$.5 billion.166  These tax benefits for higher education are becoming 
an increasingly important piece of the federal student aid puzzle.  
The education tax credits and the deduction for qualified tuition and 
related expenses alone accounted for 6% of the total federal student 
aid distributed in 2005–2006.167  The following section will briefly de-
scribe these various tax programs. 
166 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX, 109TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX 
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2005–2009, at 35 (Comm. Print 2005), available at 
http://www.house.gov/jct/s-1-05.pdf.  The Joint Committee on Taxation is required 
by the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 to calculate the 
subsidy value of various tax expenditures, defined as the amount of foregone gov-
ernmental tax revenue, as a tool for the government to use “in determining the rela-
tive merits of achieving specified public goals through tax benefits or direct outlays.”  
Id. at 2. This Article is only concerned with those tax benefits for higher education 
that are available to dependent undergraduate students to assist in paying their col-
lege expenses at the time of enrollment and that intersect with the needs analysis sys-
tem under Title IV.  Accordingly, the deduction for student loan interest was pur-
posely omitted.  See I.R.C. § 221 (2000).  The interest subsidy associated with this tax 
deduction is generally not realized until the student matriculates and begins repay-
ing college loans. 
167 TRENDS IN STUDENT AID 2006, supra note 2, at 5. 
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A. Description of Programs 
1. Hope Scholarship Credit 
The Hope Scholarship Credit (Hope credit) is a nonrefundable 
income tax credit for qualified tuition and related expenses paid dur-
ing the taxable year.168  Qualified tuition and related expenses in-
clude tuition and fees only, not room and board or other college 
costs.169  Qualified expenses must be reduced by the amount of any 
qualified scholarship, including a Pell grant award.170  The Hope 
credit is available on a per student basis and only during the first two 
years of the student’s postsecondary education.171  The credit can 
cover the qualified expenses of the taxpayer, the taxpayer’s spouse or 
any dependent claimed by the taxpayer.172  The maximum credit 
amount is $1,500 and is calculated as the sum of 100% of the first 
$1,000 in qualified expenses of the student and 50% of the next 
$1,000 in qualified expenses.173  The Hope credit is phased out ratably 
for taxpayers with an inflation-adjusted174 modified AGI175 between 
$40,000 and $50,000 ($80,000 and $100,000 in the case of a joint re-
turn).176
2. Lifetime Learning Credit 
The Lifetime Learning Credit (LLC) is a per-taxpayer, nonre-
fundable credit against income tax for the qualified tuition and re-
lated expenses paid by the taxpayer.177  The maximum credit amount 
is $2,000, calculated as an amount equal to 20% of up to $10,000 in 
qualified tuition and related expenses.178  Unlike the Hope credit, the 
168 “Nonrefundable” means that the taxpayer can only claim the credit to the ex-
tent of his or her positive income tax liability.  See infra notes 232–36 and accompany-
ing text (for a discussion of the equity implications of this form of tax credit). 
169 I.R.C. § 25A(f)(1)(A) (2000).
170 Id. § 25A(g)(2)(A). 
171 Id. § 25A(b)(1), (b)(2)(C).  The student must be enrolled on at least a half-
time basis and must not have been convicted of a felony drug offense relating to the 
possession or distribution of a controlled substance.  Id. § 25A(b)(2)(B), (b)(2)(D). 
172 Id. § 25A(f)(1)(a)(i)–(iii).
173 Id. § 25A(b)(1).  This maximum credit is adjusted for inflation for all taxable 
years beginning after 2001.  Id. § 25A(h)(1). 
174 Id. § 25A(h)(2).
175 I.R.C. § 25A(d)(3). 
176 Id. § 25A(d); see also BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION 
OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS ¶ 37.2.3 (2005).
177 I.R.C. § 25A(c) (2000). 
178 Id. § 25A(c)(1). 
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LLC can be claimed during any year of postsecondary schooling.179
The AGI limits for the LLC are the same as those for the Hope 
credit.180  In addition, the LLC uses the same definition of qualified 
expenses as the Hope credit.181  However, the qualified expenses of 
any student for whom the Hope credit is claimed cannot be taken 
into account for purposes of the LLC, even if those expenses exceed 
the maximum Hope credit amount.182  In effect, a taxpayer must 
choose on a per-student basis between claiming the LLC or Hope 
credit. 
3. Deduction for Tuition and Related Expenses 
EGTRRA enacted an alternative to either of the educational 
credits in the form of a deduction for the qualified tuition and re-
lated expenses paid by the taxpayer during the year.183  The deduc-
tion is allowable in computing AGI, making it available to all taxpay-
ers whether they itemize deductions or not.184  This deduction was 
enacted as a temporary measure; as such it was scheduled to expire in 
2005.  However, Congress extended the deduction through 2007.185
The maximum deduction amount is $4,000 if the taxpayer’s AGI186
does not exceed $65,000 ($130,000 in the case of a joint return); or 
$2,000, if the taxpayer’s AGI does not exceed $80,000 ($160,000 in 
the case of a joint return); or zero in all other cases.187
4. Qualified Tuition Programs 
Qualified tuition programs are authorized by section 529 of the 
Internal Revenue Code and are colloquially referred to as “529 
plans.”  A 529 plan is a college savings program established by a state 
or an eligible educational institution.  There are two types of 529 
plans: (1) prepaid tuition (prepaid 529 plans) and (2) college savings 
(college savings 529 plans).  States are authorized to offer both types 
179 The LLC is also available if the student is enrolled on less than a half-time ba-
sis.  See id. § 25A(c).
180 Id. § 25A(d). 
181 Id. § 25A(c)(2)(B). 
182 Id. § 25A(c)(2)(A). 
183 I.R.C. § 222(a), (c)(2)(A) (2000 Supp. I).  Qualified tuition and related ex-
penses are defined the same as for the education credits, including the reduction in 
the amount of qualified expenses to account for the receipt of any Pell grant award.  
Id. § 222(d)(1). 
184 See I.R.C. § 62(a)(18) (2000 Supp. I). 
185 Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 101, 120 Stat. 
2922 (2006).
186 AGI as defined in I.R.C. § 222(b)(2)(C) (2000 Supp. I). 
187 Id. § 222(b)(2)(B). 
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of 529 plans.  However, eligible institutions may only offer prepaid 
529 plans.  Currently, nineteen states (or institutions) offer prepaid 
529 plans, whereas all fifty states offer college savings 529 plans.188
A prepaid 529 plan allows a person to prepay the tuition of a 
designated beneficiary by purchasing tuition credits or certificates in 
advance of such beneficiary’s enrollment in college.  These certifi-
cates or credits are redeemed at the time the beneficiary attends col-
lege to purchase an amount of higher education credits equivalent to 
the amount he or she would have purchased in the original invest-
ment year.189  The purpose of the prepayment is to lock in tuition at 
current rates, thereby hedging against future tuition inflation.  The 
sponsoring state or institution itself invests prepaid 529 plan contri-
butions and uses the return to meet its current liabilities under the 
program.190  A prepaid 529 plan operates similarly to a traditional de-
fined benefit plan with the investment risk on the sponsoring state or 
institution that the return on contributions will be insufficient to 
cover tuition increases.191
A college savings 529 plan allows a person to make contributions 
to an account established for the purpose of meeting the qualified 
higher education expenses of a designated beneficiary.  The account 
owner192 chooses to direct contributions into one of several different 
188 See College Savings Plans Network, 529 Plan Comparison By State, 
http://www.collegesavings.org/planComparisonState.aspx (last visited Dec. 18, 
2006) (listing the types of prepaid 529 plans offered by each state). 
189 Katherine Baird, The Political Economy of College Prepaid Tuition Plans, 29 REV. OF 
HIGHER EDUC. 141, 142 (2006) (noting that “[i]n almost all states, accounts can also 
be redeemed for the equivalent in-state tuition value should the beneficiary choose 
to attend either a private or out-of-state institution.”). 
190 Id.
191 Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 494 
(2004) (indicating that “prepaid tuition programs are a defined-benefit-style device, 
pooling resources (the prepaid tuition payments from families concerned about in-
creasing education costs), shifting the risk associated with such costs to the program, 
and guaranteeing an output in the form of in-state tuition (whatever that might be 
when a child is ready for higher education).”).  Many states’ prepaid 529 plans are 
operating at a loss because investment returns failed to keep pace with tuition in-
creases.  Baird, supra note 189, at 143.  States responded by either closing the pro-
gram to new participants, increasing the price of tuition credits available under the 
plan, or by reducing the face value of previously purchased tuition credits.  Id.  For 
those states that guaranteed their prepaid tuition plans, funding shortfalls are ab-
sorbed by the state legislature, and ultimately by the taxpayers of the state.  Id.
192 See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.529-1(c), 63 Fed. Reg. 45019 (Aug. 24, 1998) (defin-
ing “account owner” as “the person who . . . is entitled to select or change the desig-
nated beneficiary of an account, to designate any person other than the designated 
beneficiary to whom funds may be paid from the account, or to receive distributions 
from the account if no such other person is designated”). 
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investment vehicles offered by the state,193 which are usually managed 
by private investment firms or large financial institutions.194  College 
savings 529 plans operate similarly to defined contribution plans with 
the investment risk on the designated beneficiary and his or her fam-
ily that the return on contributions will be insufficient to cover tui-
tion increases.195
Both types of 529 plans are required to accept only cash contri-
butions, maintain a separate accounting for each beneficiary, and re-
strict the investment direction of the contributor or designated bene-
ficiary.196  Generally, there is no age or other limit on who may be an 
eligible designated beneficiary.  Although there are no per contribu-
tor or per student annual contribution limits on 529 plans, each state 
or sponsoring institution must impose an overall account limit equal 
to the amount reasonably necessary to provide for the qualified 
higher education expenses of the designated beneficiary.197  In most 
states, control over a 529 plan, including the ability to make with-
drawals or change designated beneficiaries, is vested in the account 
owner.198  The account owner can be any person and need not be the 
plan originator, contributor, or designated beneficiary. 
193 See id. § 1.529-2(g).  This is allowed despite the statutory prohibition against a 
“contributor to, or a designated beneficiary under, such [qualified tuition] program . 
. . directly or indirectly direct[ing] the investment of any contribution to the pro-
gram (or any earnings thereon).”  I.R.C. § 529(b)(4) (2000 Supp. I). 
194 Michael A. Olivas, State College Savings and Prepaid Tuition Plans: A Reappraisal 
and Review, 32 J.L. & EDUC. 475, 477 (2003).  The author offers some illuminating in-
sights into the decreased state presence in these plans largely run by private invest-
ment firms.  See id. at 490–500.  Cf. Mercer E. Bullard, The Visible Hand in Government-
Sponsored Financial Services: Why States Should Not Be Allowed to Offer 529 Plans, 74 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1265 (2006) (arguing against state sponsorship of 529 plans).
195 Zelinsky, supra note 191, at 495. 
196 I.R.C. § 529(b)(2)–(4) (2000 Supp. I).  A plan does not violate this require-
ment if the person who establishes the account is permitted to select among different 
investment strategies chosen by the program.  Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.529-2(g), 63 Fed. 
Reg. 45019 (Aug. 24, 1998). 
197 I.R.C. § 529(b)(6) (2000 Supp. I).  The state cumulative contribution limits 
range from $235,000 to $344,000.  See Compare 529 Plans by Maximum Contribu-
tions, http://www.savingforcollege.com/compare_529_plans/index.php?plan_ques 
tion_idspercent5Bpercent5D=308&mode=Go&page=compare_plan_questions (last 
visited Sept. 26, 2007). 
198 See supra note 192. 
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Generally, the 529 plan itself is exempt from taxation.199  Contri-
butions to a 529 plan are not deductible; however, the amounts con-
tributed grow income tax-free until distributed.200  For taxable years 
after 2001,201 distributions from 529 plans applied towards the pay-
ment of the qualified higher educational expenses of the designated 
beneficiary are excluded from gross income.202  Qualified higher edu-
cation expenses include tuition, fees, books, supplies and equipment, 
and in the case of a student enrolled on at least a half-time basis, 
room and board.203  Non-qualified distributions (those used for some 
purpose other than the payment of the higher education expenses of 
the designated beneficiary) are taxable to the distributee as an annu-
ity.204  In addition to the regular income tax imposed on nonqualified 
distributions, subject to certain exceptions, a 10% penalty tax is also 
imposed.205  Rollovers to another 529 plan206 or a change in desig-
nated beneficiary of an existing 529 plan are income-tax-free as long 
as the new designated beneficiary is a member of the family207 of the 
original designated beneficiary.208
199 I.R.C. § 529(a) (2000).  This was not always the case.  Prior to the enactment of 
§ 529 in 1996, there was continuing litigation regarding the exempt status of the 
Michigan Educational Trust, the first state-sponsored prepaid plan.  See, e.g., Michi-
gan v. United States, 40 F.3d 817 (6th Cir. 1994), rev’d, 802 F. Supp. 120 (W.D. Mich. 
1992); see also Jeffrey S. Lehman, Social Irresponsibility, Actuarial Assumptions, and 
Wealth Redistribution:  Lessons About Public Policy from a Prepaid Tuition Program, 88 
MICH. L. REV. 1035 (1990) (providing a detailed analysis of the original Michigan 
Education Trust); Eric A. Lustig, supra note 21, at 244–53 (describing history of taxa-
tion of 529 plans prior to enactment of I.R.C. § 529). 
200 I.R.C. § 529(c)(1) (2000). 
201 Prior to the 2001 Act, distributions from 529 plans were generally taxable to 
the beneficiary or contributor.  See generally STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION,
GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE 106TH CONGRESS—BLUE 
BOOK 9–11 (Comm. Print 2001), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/ 
Documents.asp?section=8 (follow link to report).  The Pension Protection Act of 
2006 made permanent the EGTRRA changes to I.R.C. § 529, including the federal 
tax exclusion for qualified distributions from a 529 plan. Pension Protection Act of 
2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 1304, 120 Stat. 780, 1109 (2006).
202 I.R.C. § 529(c)(3)(B) (2000 Supp. I). 
203 Id. § 529(e)(3). 
204 Id. § 529(c)(3) (cross-referencing annuity rules set forth in I.R.C. § 72). 
205 Id. §§ 529(c)(6), 530(d)(4).  The penalty tax is not imposed if a distribution is 
(1) made on or after the death of a beneficiary; (2) attributable to the beneficiary’s 
being disabled; (3) made on account of a scholarship, allowance, or payment that is 
described in § 25A(g)(2); and (4) made on account of the beneficiary attending cer-
tain U.S. military academies.  Id.
206 Rollovers can be to a plan for the same beneficiary or for a different benefici-
ary.  Id. § 529(c)(3)(C)(i). 
207 A member of the family includes a designated beneficiary’s spouse, child or 
descendant of a child (or their spouse), sibling or step-sibling (or their spouse), par-
ent or ancestor of parent (or their spouse), step parent, niece or nephew (or their 
RYAN_FINAL 1/7/2008 3:39:07 PM 
28 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1 
In addition to the income tax benefits just described, certain 
significant federal wealth transfer tax benefits attach to 529 plans.  
Contributions to 529 plans are considered completed gifts of present 
interests.209  Absent this provision, contributions to 529 plans would 
be tested under the normal gift tax rules to determine whether the 
gift was complete and whether it was of a present interest in prop-
erty.210  Automatically treating all contributions as completed gifts of 
present interests in property qualifies all contributions for the annual 
gift tax exclusion.211  In 2006, this would allow a single donor to make 
up to a $12,000 contribution to a 529 plan gift tax-free.212  Addition-
ally, a donor can elect to treat a single contribution as made ratably 
over a five-year period, thereby allowing the contributor to front-load 
up to five years worth of gift tax annual exclusions.213  In 2006, such 
an election would allow a contributor to make a single transfer of 
$60,000 to a 529 plan without any federal wealth transfer tax im-
posed.214  Distributions from 529 plans are not considered taxable 
gifts.215  Rollovers or changes in designated beneficiaries are also ex-
empt from gift and generation-skipping transfer taxation, as long as 
the new designated beneficiary is assigned to the same generation (or 
spouse), aunt or uncle (or their spouse), son-in-law (or his spouse), daughter-in-law 
(or her spouse), father-in-law (or his spouse), mother-in-law (or her spouse), 
brother-in-law (or his spouse) or sister-in-law (or her spouse), or a first cousin.  Id. §§ 
529(e)(2), 152(d)(2). 
208 Id. § 529(c)(3)(C). 
209 Id. § 529(c)(2)(A)(i). 
210 See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2 (as amended in 1999) (explaining when a gift is 
complete for purposes of the gift tax); Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(b) (as amended in 
1983) (defining present interest in property).  A 529 plan contributor, with the 
power, as account owner or otherwise, to withdraw a previously made contribution or 
to change plan beneficiaries, would not receive completed gift treatment on the 
original plan contribution.   The existence of these powers would depend on the 
plan itself.  The inability of the 529 plan beneficiary to immediately use, possess, or 
enjoy the contribution would defeat a finding of a present interest in property. 
211 I.R.C. § 2503(b) (2000); see Rev. Proc. 2005-70, 2005-2 C.B. 974 (listing $12,000 
as the inflation-adjusted annual exclusion amount under § 2503(b) for taxable year 
2006). 
212 See Rev. Proc. 2005-70, 2005-2 C.B. 974.  In 2006, married couples that elected 
gift-splitting could transfer up to $24,000 gift tax-free.  I.R.C. § 2513 (2000). 
213 I.R.C. § 529(c)(2)(B) (2000 Supp. I).  In the event that the donor dies during 
the five-year period following such a contribution, the gross estate of the donor in-
cludes the portions of the contributions allocable to periods after the death of the 
donor.  Id. § 529(c)(4)(C). 
214 In 2006, married couples who elected gift-splitting and who chose to treat a 
single contribution to a 529 plan as made ratably over a five-year period could trans-
fer up to $120,000 gift tax-free.  See supra notes 212–213. 
215 I.R.C. § 529(c)(5)(A) (2000 Supp. I). 
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higher) as the old beneficiary.216  Subject to certain exceptions, an in-
terest in a 529 plan will not cause estate tax inclusion for any individ-
ual.217
5. Coverdell Education Savings Account 
A Coverdell education savings account (Coverdell account) is “a 
trust created or organized in the Unites States exclusively for the 
purpose of paying the qualified education expenses” of the desig-
nated beneficiary.218  Until 2001, these tax-favored college savings 
plans were known as “Education IRAs.”219  Although similar in pur-
pose to a college savings 529 plan, Coverdell accounts are privately 
administered rather than state or institution sponsored.  The income 
and transfer tax consequences for contributions to and distributions 
from Coverdell accounts are similar to those of college savings 529 
plans.220  In addition, both types of college savings plans enjoy similar 
liberal rules regarding changes in beneficiary and plan rollovers.221
Despite general similarity in tax treatment, Coverdell accounts 
differ from 529 plans in several important ways.  First, Coverdell ac-
counts include elementary and secondary educational expenses as 
qualified expenses.222  Second, contributions to Coverdell accounts 
must be made before the designated beneficiary’s eighteenth birth-
day223 and any balance in the account must be distributed within 
thirty days of the beneficiary’s thirtieth birthday or, if the beneficiary 
dies before attaining age thirty, must be distributed within thirty days 
after the date of death.224  Third, annual account contributions are 
limited in the aggregate to $2,000 per year.225  Fourth, unlike 529 
216 Id. § 529(c)(5)(B). 
217 Id. § 529(c)(4).  This section indicates that the two exceptions to this rule are 
for amounts distributed on account of the death of a beneficiary, and in the case of a 
deceased donor who elected to treat a contribution as made ratably over a five–year 
period, only the portion of such contribution properly allocable to periods after the 
death of the donor.  Id.  Under normal estate tax rules, an account owner with the 
ability to change beneficiaries or to cause account balances to be distributed to the 
account owner would suffer estate tax inclusion of all or a portion of the college sav-
ings plans.  See I.R.C. §§ 2036, 2038, 2041 (2000). 
218 I.R.C. § 530(b)(1) (2000 Supp. I). 
219 See Act of July 26, 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-22, § 1, 115 Stat. 196, 196–97 (officially 
changing the name from “Education IRA” to “Coverdell education savings account”). 
220 See  I.R.C. § 530(d) (2000 Supp. I). 
221 Id. § 530(d)(5)–(6). 
222 Id. § 530(b)(2). 
223 Id. § 530(b)(1)(A)(ii). 
224 Id. § 530(b)(1)(E). 
225 Id. § 530(b)(1)(A)(iii).  This means that no accelerated gift tax annual exclu-
sion option is necessary, and accordingly none is provided. 
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plan contributors, Coverdell account contributors are subject to cer-
tain AGI limitations.  The ability to make the maximum contribution 
amount to a Coverdell account begins to phase out for an individual 
with a modified AGI226 exceeding $95,000 ($190,000 in the case of a 
joint return) and is completely phased out for an individual with an 
AGI exceeding $110,000 ($220,000 in the case of a joint return).227
B. Equity, Efficiency, and Complexity 
Delivering these higher education subsidies through the tax sys-
tem rather than through traditional student aid spending channels 
has certain implications for the equity, efficiency, and complexity of 
the federal financial aid system as a whole. 
1. Equity 
The tax benefits for higher education in the form of a deduction 
or an exclusion from income, including the deduction for higher 
education expenses and the exclusion of earnings in tax-favored col-
lege savings plans, are regressive in the distribution of their benefits.  
The value of the subsidy provided by these types of tax expenditures 
increases as the taxpayer’s marginal rate bracket increases.228  Fur-
thermore, non-taxpayers are completely foreclosed from realizing any 
higher education subsidy from the education-related deduction and 
exclusions.229  In 2004, 35% of taxpayers had no positive income tax 
liability, and these same taxpayers housed almost half of all America’s 
children.230
One way to temper the regressivity of these types of tax expendi-
tures is to impose AGI limits on who may claim the benefit.  As de-
scribed above, AGI limits are imposed on the education-related de-
226 “Modified” AGI means the AGI of the contributor increased by any amount 
excluded from gross income under I.R.C. §§ 911, 931, or 933.  Id. § 530(c)(2). 
227 Id. § 530(c); see also BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 176, at ¶ 16.8.
228 STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 71–72 (1985) (de-
scribing the upside-down nature of many tax subsidies).  The subsidy value of a de-
duction or exclusion from income is equal to the amount of deduction or exclusion 
multiplied by the taxpayer’s marginal income tax rate. 
229 Id. at 72. 
230 Lily L. Batchelder et al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax 
Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23, 28 (2006) (citing William G. Gale, Tax Bracket and Tax 
Liabilities for Families with Children, 105 TAX NOTES 1145 (2004); Peter R. Orszag & 
Matthew G. Hall, Nonfilers and Filers with Modest Tax Liabilities, 100 TAX NOTES 723 
(2003); Scott A. Hodge, Number of Americans Outside the Income Tax System Continues to 
Grow, FISCAL FACTS 27 (Tax Found., Washington, D.C.), June 9, 2005, available at 
http:// www.taxfoundation.org/publications/show/542.html). 
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duction and credit claimants, and Coverdell account contributors.231
Although this does not cure regressivity below the AGI limitation, it 
does prevent high-income taxpayers from claiming the college tax 
benefit.  On the other hand, 529 plans impose no AGI limitations 
and therefore allow the highest income taxpayers, those least in need 
of federal financial assistance, to claim disproportionately large fed-
eral higher education subsidies. 
Another way to mitigate the regressive distribution of tax expen-
diture benefits is to design the tax program as a credit against tax 
rather than as a deduction or exclusion.232  This is the approach of 
the education-related tax credits.  The amount of a Hope credit or a 
LLC reduces the claimant’s income tax payable on a dollar-for-dollar 
basis regardless of the family’s marginal rate bracket.  However, since 
neither education-related credit is refundable, the maximum credit is 
limited by the amount of the taxpayer’s positive income tax liability.233
In 2006, a married couple with two dependents who claimed only the 
standard deduction and personal exemptions would not incur posi-
tive income tax liability until their gross income reached $23,500.234
To claim the maximum LLC of $2,000, this same family would need 
to report at least $41,850 in gross income.235  Both of these thresholds 
would be pushed higher if the same family claimed the earned in-
come tax credit.236  Accordingly, the poorest families cannot benefit 
231 See supra notes 176, 180, 187, 227 and accompanying text.  It is interesting to 
note that the more regressive tax benefits for higher education (education-related 
deductions and exclusions) enjoy higher AGI limitations than the less regressive tax 
benefits (education credits). 
232 SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 228, at 108. 
233 See Bridget Terry Long, The Impact of Federal Tax Credits for Higher Education Ex-
penses, in COLLEGE CHOICES: THE ECONOMICS OF WHERE TO GO, WHEN TO GO, AND HOW 
TO PAY FOR IT 101, 115 (Caroline M. Hoxby ed., 2004) (using 1999 income tax return 
data, Long’s study found that “half of the higher education tax credit beneficiaries 
were not able to take the full credit for which they were otherwise eligible” because 
of insufficient positive income tax liability). 
234 Author’s calculation assuming that the family has no other deductions except 
the standard deduction ($10,300 in 2006) and personal exemptions ($3,300 each).  
See Internal Revenue Service 2006 Form 1040, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/f1040.pdf?portlet=3.
235 Author’s calculation.  The level of taxable income required to incur at least 
$2,000 in taxes for 2006 is $18,350.  See Internal Revenue Service 2006 1040A Instruc-
tions, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1040a.pdf.  To have $18,350 in taxable in-
come after personal exemptions and credits requires at least $41,850 in gross in-
come. 
236 I.R.C. § 32 (2000).  The earned income tax credit is a refundable tax credit 
available to low-income working families.  In 2007, married taxpayers filing jointly 
with one qualifying child could claim a partial earned income tax credit if their AGI 
was below $35,241.   Rev. Proc. 2006-53, 2006-48 I.R.B. 996. 
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from the education-related tax credits at all and lower-income fami-
lies may see their educational credit amount limited by their other-
wise minimal positive income tax liability. 
The empirical data supports the hypothesis that the tax benefits 
from the tuition deduction and the higher-education-related tax 
credits are largely enjoyed by middle- and upper-middle-income tax-
payers.  In 2004, 35% of the tax savings from claiming an education 
credit went to families with AGIs between $25,000 and $49,999; 31% 
went to families with AGIs between $50,000 and $74,999; and 23% 
went to families with AGIs between $75,000 and $99,999.237  Only 11% 
of the tax savings from the education-related credits went to families 
with AGI below $25,000.238  The data on the higher education deduc-
tion claimants is skewed even further up the income scale.239  Thirty-
six percent of the tax benefit from the tuition tax deduction was 
claimed by families with AGIs between $50,000 and $99,999, and 41% 
was claimed by families with AGIs between $100,000 and $160,000.240
Although no tax return data is available with regard to the tax 
savings associated with the education-related savings accounts, the re-
gressive distribution of tax benefits combined with the relatively 
higher AGI limit for Coverdell account contributors and the lack of 
an AGI limitation for 529 plan contributors suggests that the subsi-
dies associated with contributions to college savings plans are enjoyed 
by those families on the highest end of the income scale.241  Using a 
2001 Survey of Consumer Finances, Dynarski estimated that the me-
dian income of households holding a tax-favored college savings ac-
count was $91,000, which was $41,000 higher than the median in-
come for all households with children under the age of sixteen.242
An additional distributional problem, unique to tax-favored col-
lege savings plans, is introduced by the fact that families cannot real-
ize any tax benefit until they actually make a plan contribution from 
their own funds.  Lower-income families may lack available after-tax 
disposable income to contribute to a 529 plan or Coverdell account.  
Even for a lower-income family with available funds, a 529 plan or 
237 TRENDS IN STUDENT AID 2006, supra note 2, at 25 fig. 16. 
238 Id.
239 This is a result of the higher AGI limit imposed on taxpayers claiming the tui-
tion deduction.  See supra note 187 and accompanying text. 
240 TRENDS IN STUDENT AID 2006, supra note 2, at 25 fig. 17. 
241 Since there is no deduction for contributions to tax-favored college savings 
plans, there is nothing for a plan contributor to report on his or her tax return.  In 
addition, the exclusion from income associated with college savings plans is also not 
reported on a tax return. 
242 Dynarski, Who Benefits, supra note 25, at 364 tbl. 1. 
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Coverdell account may not be a wise investment.  The small tax bene-
fit realized may be far outweighed by the risks involved in committing 
funds to a tax-favored college savings plan or account.243  Recall that 
non-qualifying plan or account distributions incur a regular income 
tax and a 10% penalty tax.  For lower-income families, the risk that 
non-qualifying distributions will be made is higher than for other 
families because there is a greater risk that the designated beneficiary 
will not attend college or that the college savings funds will be 
needed for other current consumption purposes.244  For the highest-
income taxpayers, the large tax savings that can be realized by saving 
in a 529 plan or Coverdell account may outweigh the very small risks 
of nonattendance or needing the funds for non-qualifying purposes. 
The additional federal wealth transfer tax advantages afforded 
529 plans and Coverdell accounts also skew the benefits of these 
plans in favor of high-income taxpayers.  Lower- and middle-income 
taxpayers are simply not subject to these taxes and derive no benefit 
from any transfer tax expenditure.245  Even when a non-qualified dis-
tribution is made, there is no recapture of any federal wealth transfer 
tax benefits previously provided to the contributor.  Compare this to 
the income tax treatment of non-qualifying distributions.  In the case 
of a non-qualifying distribution from a tax-favored college savings ac-
count, an income tax and a penalty tax attach.  Presumably, since the 
income tax exemption is justified as a way of encouraging families to 
save for college, when that assumption turns out to be false, the ex-
emption no longer applies.  However, the treatment of the initial 
transfer as a completed gift of a present interest when it would not 
otherwise have been is not recast upon a non-qualifying distribution.  
In addition, the contributor can continue to exert control over the 
beneficial enjoyment of the property as account owner, with no fear 
of estate tax inclusion, even if the funds are not used to pay college 
expenses.246  Depending on the contributor, these transfer tax bene-
243 As described above, the subsidy value of an exclusion from gross income is di-
rectly tied to the taxpayer’s marginal rate bracket.  The amount of tax saved by ex-
cluding an item of income is equal to the amount of the exclusion multiplied by the 
taxpayer’s marginal income tax rate. 
244 See supra note 5 (detailing the enrollment gaps between the lowest income 
quintiles and the highest). 
245 Currently, the gift tax is not imposed until taxable gifts exceed one million dol-
lars and the estate tax is not imposed until the taxable estate exceeds two million dol-
lars.  I.R.C. §§ 2010(c), 2505(a)(1) (2000 Supp. I). Married couples can effectively 
double these taxable limits. 
246 See supra notes 210, 217 (discussing the normal transfer tax rules that would be 
applicable to a contributor to or account owner of a tax-favored college savings 
plan). 
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fits may overcome the income and penalty taxes imposed and make 
investing in a tax-favored college savings plan a winning proposition 
no matter how the designated beneficiary ultimately uses the funds. 
The higher education tax expenditures mainly benefit middle- 
and upper-income taxpayers with little or no subsidy provided to low-
income taxpayers.  This distribution pattern works at cross purposes 
with progressive goals of Title IV and introduces an unsavory amount 
of regressivity into the overall distribution of federal higher educa-
tion dollars.  However, one could argue that the college tax subsidies 
temper the impact of the high marginal implicit tax rates that fami-
lies face under the EFC formula in the Title IV needs analysis.  The 
process of calculating the EFC by assessing the income and assets of a 
family at statutorily prescribed rates has been criticized as a system of 
implicit taxation that reduces incentives to work and to save.247  For 
those families subject to the FM, every additional dollar of income or 
increase in includable248 asset value results in a proportionate de-
crease in eligibility for Title IV need-based aid.  Under this line of 
analysis, the annual maximum implicit tax rate under the FM on pa-
rental income is 47% and on parental assets is 5.64%.249  However, 
the assessment process under the FM is an annual one, resulting in a 
cumulative parental asset implicit taxation rate over a four-year pe-
riod of 21%.250  Similarly, the implicit annual tax rates on student in-
come and assets are 50% and 35%, respectively.251  Cumulatively, the 
FM implicitly taxes student assets at a rate of 82% over a four-year col-
lege career.252
There are multiple responses to this argument.  First, these im-
plicit tax rates may be overstated because they assume that financial 
aid is an entitlement that covers 100% of a student’s need as calcu-
lated under the FM.253  In fact, except at certain elite institutions, fi-
nancial aid covers less than 100% of need.254  Second, although eco-
nomic theory suggests a potential disincentive to work and to save as 
247 See, e.g., Dick & Edlin, supra note 23, at 295–322; Martin Feldstein, College Schol-
arship Rules and Private Savings, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 552, 552–66 (1995). 
248 See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
249 See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
250 Dynarski, Who Benefits, supra note 25, at 378 (using formula [=1-(1-.0564)4]). 
251 See supra notes 141–43 and accompanying text.  Note that this does not take 
into account the reduction in asset rate applied to student assets under HERA. 
252 Dynarski, Who Benefits, supra note 25, at 378. 
253 Dick & Edlin, supra note 23, at 296–97, 319 (finding that financial aid implicit 
tax rates are smaller than those suggested in earlier studies because the earlier stud-
ies assumed that aid equals need under the FM while their study used empirical data 
on actual aid awards to calculate financial aid awards). 
254 Id. at 297. 
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a result of implicit taxation under Title IV, empirical evidence is 
needed to prove that the FM actually affects work and savings.255
Even critics admit that the extent to which parents understand these 
incentives and act accordingly remains unclear.256  Therefore, the 
need for mitigation through tax subsidies is overstated. 
Third, the marginal implicit tax rates under the FM apply only to 
those families who are potentially eligible for financial aid.  Two types 
of families on opposite ends of the income spectrum are entirely ex-
empt from implicit taxation under the aid system.257  The lowest in-
come families will qualify for the maximum amount of Title IV need-
based aid regardless of marginal changes in income or wealth.  The 
very highest income families will never qualify for Title IV need-based 
aid regardless of marginal changes in income or wealth.258  Hence, 
any college tax subsidy that benefits these two categories of families 
cannot be justified on the basis of its ameliorating effect on implicit 
marginal tax rates under the FM.  While the poorest families realize 
no tax benefit from the higher education tax expenditures, the 
wealthiest families enjoy the largest subsidies associated with the tax-
favored college savings plans.259
The final response to the argument that college tax benefits are 
necessary to mitigate the effects of high implicit tax rates under the 
FM relates to the fact that middle-income families have been receiv-
ing relief from implicit tax rates on assets under the FM since 1992, 
when home equity and retirement accounts were excluded from im-
plicit taxation.  This lowered the overall effective implicit marginal 
tax rate on assets under the EFC formula.  Accordingly, it is question-
able whether additional relief through a tax subsidy is necessary. 
255 See Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based 
Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533, 546–52 (1994) (offering a similar critique of 
the claim by critics of the earned income tax credit that the credit creates disincen-
tives to work over its phase-out range). 
256 Dick & Edlin, supra note 23, at 319.  A lack of understanding of the EFC for-
mula results from its complexity and the fact that the financial aid applicant does not 
actually calculate the EFC; the Department of Education does.  See supra notes 147–
54 and accompanying text.  However, familiarity with the EFC formula and its disin-
centive effects may be increasing with the advent of websites that contain EFC calcu-
lators and that detail financial aid maximization strategies.  See, e.g., FinAid!, 
http://www.finaid.org/; Financial Aid—Petersons,  http://www.petersons.com/fin 
aid/file.asp?id=780&path=ug.pfs.financial (last visited Dec. 14, 2006). 
257 Dynarski, Who Benefits, supra note 25, at 376.
258 For both sets of families, the implicit tax rate on an additional dollar of income 
or asset value is zero.   Id. at 376–77. 
259 This is a result of the relatively high AGI limitations that apply to Coverdell ac-
count contributors and the lack of an AGI limitation applicable to 529 plan contribu-
tors.  See supra note 227 and accompanying text. 
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The asset exclusions also created inequities in the distribution of 
Title IV need-based benefits.  Consider two families with equal 
amounts of income and wealth.  On a pure ability-to-pay basis, each 
family should qualify for the same amount of need-based federal fi-
nancial aid.  However, the composition of their asset holdings may 
change the predicted outcome.  The family that holds most of their 
wealth in the form of home equity and retirement accounts will qual-
ify for more need-based aid than the family with a different asset mix.  
This violates notions of horizontal equity.  Consider also the case of 
two families of unequal wealth who both qualify for the same amount 
of federal need-based financial aid because the wealthier family holds 
a portion of their wealth in the form of home equity and retirement 
plans.  In this case, vertical equity is violated.  The preference in the 
aid system for home ownership and retirement accounts is in addi-
tion to the already generous treatment of these assets by the federal 
income taxation system.260
2. Efficiency 
One can measure efficiency in a number of different ways.  This 
Part is concerned only with one type of efficiency, namely, the ability 
of the tax expenditures for higher education to achieve their stated 
public policy goals of increased college access, affordability, and sav-
ings.261
a. Access 
The tax benefits for higher education can only increase access to 
college if the financial subsidy induces students who would not oth-
erwise attend college to enroll.  Otherwise, the government is subsi-
dizing an activity that would have occurred anyway absent the subsidy.  
The economic studies cited in Part II.C suggest that lower-income po-
tential college students are the most sensitive to price in making the 
enrollment decision.  In addition, lower-income students are the 
most underrepresented population, by family income level, of college 
attendees.262  Accordingly, to expand access to higher education, and 
to make it more equally available across income classes, federal subsi-
260 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 121, 163 (2000) (for income tax benefits available to home-
owners); id. §§ 401, 403, 408, 408A (for income tax benefits available to retirement 
savers).
261 Statement by President Clinton, supra note 50. 
262 A 32% gap remains between the college participation rates of families earning 
below $25,000 per year and families earnings above $75,000 per year.  See ACCESS 
DENIED, supra note 85. 
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dies should be aimed at lower-income students.  As previously de-
scribed, the tax benefits for higher education provide little or no 
benefit to lower-income students.  This suggests that they will have lit-
tle effect on college enrollment levels.  Available empirical data on 
the education-related credits support this conclusion.  Bridget Terry 
Long studied the impact of the educational credits on college access 
three years after enactment and found no enrollment response after 
the introduction of the credits.263
The study’s lack of an enrollment response from the college tax 
credits can be partially explained by a lack of knowledge about the 
existence of the tax credits at the time of the study.264  Even those tax-
payers who are aware of the education tax credits do not always claim 
the credit for which they are eligible.265  Furthermore, the distribu-
tional impact of the college tax credits favors middle-income taxpay-
ers, who would have attended college with or without the subsidy.266
In addition, the timing of the delivery of the tax credits may further 
explain why these provisions failed to induce increased college en-
rollment.267  Simply put, the tuition subsidy may come too late to af-
fect access.  In most cases, a family that pays its tuition bill in August 
will not realize the federal subsidy until it files a tax return in the year 
following the year of payment.  In other words, the tax credit amount 
reimburses the claimant for tuition payments already made.  Title IV 
aid, on the other hand, offsets current tuition bills.  For families lack-
ing the liquidity to pay their tuition charges as they fall due, the exis-
tence of a future tax credit may have no effect on their current en-
rollment decision.  Even for those families who can afford to make 
the tuition payment, the subsidy is delivered after the enrollment de-
cision was already made. 
263 Long, supra note 233, at 137. 
264 Id. at 122 (finding that only one-third of the parents asked in a 1999 National 
Household Education Survey (NHES) had heard of one of the education tax credits, 
and only 21.5% and 18.7% had heard of the Hope scholarship credit and LLC, re-
spectively).
265 A recent study suggests that 74% of eligible students used the Hope credit and 
63% used the LLC.  Burman et al., supra note 25, at 15.  The authors note that “par-
ticipation tends to rise with income, raising the concern that those most in need are 
least likely to participate, even when eligible.”  Id.  The authors speculate that low-
income families’ lower take-up rate is attributable to a lack of knowledge of the exis-
tence of the credits combined with the minimal or nonexistent benefit available 
when positive income tax liability is limited or lacking.  Id. at 15-16. 
266 See supra notes 232–40 and accompanying text (describing distributional effects 
of education-related tax credits); see also Burman et al., supra note 25, at 14. 
267 Long, supra note 233, at 103–04; see also JACKSON, supra note 72, at 16 (noting 
that it is possible to mitigate the timing problem if taxpayers adjust their income tax 
withholding so that their take-home pay is greater over the entire tax year). 
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In reality, the timing of the tuition subsidy provided by the col-
lege tax credits may only be a problem during the first year of post-
secondary education.  When the bill for the second year arrives, the 
increased wealth realized as a result of the tax credits or deduction 
could be put towards the higher education expenses of that year.  
However, a family could also spend their increased wealth on a vaca-
tion or another consumption-type expense.  Accordingly, as noted by 
Kane, the higher education credits and deduction will primarily pro-
duce an income effect on families with college students, rather than a 
price effect, “as if the federal government were sending families a tax 
refund unrelated to how much more they spend on college.”268
The potential effect (or non-effect) on college access of the tui-
tion tax deduction would be similar to that of the education credits 
because it serves as an alternative to either of the tax credits.  As for 
529 plans and Coverdell accounts, if a family lacks the financial 
wherewithal to save in the first place, there is no potential enrollment 
response to be realized by the existence of these tax-favored savings 
plans. 
b. Affordability 
It is unclear whether the tax benefits for higher education make 
college more affordable, especially if, as noted by Kane above, they 
primarily produce an income rather than a price effect.  To make col-
lege more affordable, the tax subsidies must reduce net price.  If col-
leges and universities raise their tuitions in response to the existence 
of additional federal funds, then students realize no net price de-
crease.269  Under this scenario, the tax benefits serve as an indirect 
subsidy to colleges and universities.  When the education-related tax 
credits were introduced, many states reacted by explicitly considering 
ways to capture the new federal higher education dollars.270  Long 
studied the possible effects of the introduction of the education cred-
its on college pricing and found “some evidence to support that pub-
lic two-year colleges responded to incentives created by the tax credits 
by raising tuition price beyond what can be explained by fluctuations 
in state support, and the responses were stronger for schools with a 
268 KANE, supra note 66, at 45. 
269 Note also that if schools reduce their own need-based aid in response to the 
existence of the college tax subsidies, a similar result would follow.
270 Long, supra note 233, at 144–145 (describing how California, Arkansas, Minne-
sota, North Carolina, Washington, and New York all considered raising in-state tui-
tion at public colleges to capture the additional federal aid). 
RYAN_FINAL 1/7/2008 3:39:07 PM 
2008] ACCESS ASSURED 39 
greater proportion of credit-eligible students.”271  This institutional 
response has a particularly harsh effect on low-income students who 
are disproportionately represented at public two-year colleges, and 
who face increased tuition as a result of the existence of the college 
tax credits without the ability to claim their benefits because of 
minimal positive income tax liability.272
The higher education tax expenditures will also not affect af-
fordability if the existence of the additional subsidy induces students 
to attend more expensive colleges.  The structure of the education-
related tax credits encourages students to attend more expensive col-
leges, especially the LLC credit, where the maximum amount cannot 
be obtained until the student incurs $10,000 in tuition expenses.273
The existence of a large balance in a tax-favored college savings plan 
may also induce a student to attend a more expensive college in or-
der to minimize the possibility of paying the taxes associated with 
non-qualifying distributions of excess unused plan funds upon ma-
triculation.274  Affordability will also not be enhanced to the extent 
that a portion of the tax savings associated with a college savings plan 
is lost to financial intermediaries in the form of commissions and 
fees.275  This is especially true with regard to state sponsored 529 
plans, which are usually managed by private investment firms or large 
financial institutions.276
271 Id. at 161. 
272 TRENDS IN STUDENT AID 2006, supra note 2, at 22 (chart entitled “Income Dis-
tribution of Families within Public Two-Year and Four-Year Institutions, 2003–4004” 
shows that while 31% of families in the lowest income quartile attended a public two-
year institution only 18% of families in the top income quartile attended public two-
year institutions). 
273 See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
274 The liberal beneficiary change and rollover rules for the tax-favored college 
savings plans could mitigate this possibility, which, in turn, would mitigate the incen-
tive effect to maximize the use of the funds for any one beneficiary’s higher educa-
tion expenses.  See supra notes 206–08, 221 and accompanying text. 
275 See SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 228, at 84.  On the issue of 529 plan fees, 
see LINDA L. LEVINE, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, SAVING FOR COLLEGE THROUGH 
QUALIFIED TUITION (SECTION 529) PROGRAMS 5–8 (2004) (chronicling the history of 
Congress’s investigation into the fees charged by various plans and the regulatory 
oversight of such plans, including a discussion of whether 529 plans are subject to 
the federal securities laws regarding financial information disclosure).  Reportedly, 
expenses and fees in 529 plans are higher than in other types of savings vehicles.  Id.
at 5. 
276 Olivas, supra note 194, at 490–500 (offering illuminating insights into the de-
creased state presence in these plans largely run by private investment firms).  In 
2003, approximately two-thirds of college savings 529 plans were sold through finan-
cial intermediaries.  LEVINE, supra note 275 at 6. 
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The amount of tax assistance available to a family with a student 
in college depends not only on the level of higher education ex-
penses incurred by the family, but also on the family’s overall tax 
situation for the year.277  This may impede the ability of the higher 
education tax benefits to make college more affordable in any given 
year.  For example, if Congress lowers income tax rates, or the fam-
ily’s income suddenly drops them into a lower tax bracket, the tax 
benefits available to the family may be limited for that year.  For ex-
ample, between 2001 and 2002, participation in the education tax 
credit programs decreased.278  This may be attributable to the overall 
income tax rate reduction enacted under EGTRRA.279
c. Savings 
According to the JCT, in enacting the tax-favored college savings 
plans, Congress wanted “to encourage families and students to save 
for future education expenses.”280  It is unclear whether 529 plans and 
Coverdell accounts have induced new college savings or have simply 
allowed wealthy individuals to shift existing non-tax advantaged col-
lege savings into these new vehicles.  In 2001, Dynarski profiled 
Coverdell and 529 investors as those with “incomes, education and 
wealth that are higher than those of both retirement savers and the 
general population.”281  These characteristics suggested that the fami-
lies who are taking advantage of the college savings incentives are 
those who probably would have saved for higher education anyway 
absent the subsidy.282  What the study did not show was whether the 
dollars invested in the college savings plans were new savings dollars, 
277 See SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 228, at 103–04. 
278 JACKSON, supra note 72, at 8.  “Participation” as used in the text includes a de-
crease in the number and amount of credits claimed.  Id. at 8 tbl. 1. 
279 Id.
280 STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX 
LEGISLATION ENACTED IN 1997—BLUE BOOK, at 27 (1997), available at http://waysand 
means.house.gov/Documents.asp?section=8 (follow link to report) [hereinafter TAX 
LEGISLATION ENACTED IN 1997]. 
281 Dynarski, Who Benefits, supra note 25, at 365.  Dynarski admitted to the defi-
ciencies in using a 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances, as the data set predated the 
expansion of tax benefits of college savings plans under the 2001 Act.  Id. at 363.  In 
concluding, Dynarski stated “college savers may become more similar to the typical 
household with children, and to other savers, as the programs widen in popularity.”  
Id. at 365.  Since 2001, the amount of funds in state-sponsored 529 plans has bal-
looned from $2.5 million to $8.5 million.  TRENDS IN STUDENT AID 2006, supra note 2, 
at 24 fig. 15.  Accordingly, the education saver profile might look quite different to-
day. 
282 Dynarski, Who Benefits, supra note 25, at 365; see also Burman et al., supra note 
25, at 16 (making a similar observation). 
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or existing savings dollars merely shifted into the new tax- advantaged 
accounts.283  In the latter case, no increase in overall savings would  
result. 
3. Complexity 
The addition of these tax expenditures for higher education 
adds complexity to an already complex federal student aid system.284
Complexity potentially limits the effectiveness of the tax benefits as 
vehicles through which higher education subsidies may be delivered 
to their intended beneficiaries. 
Initially, lack of knowledge of the existence of the various educa-
tion-related tax benefits slowed expected participation rates.  For ex-
ample, the actual revenue loss to the federal government from 1998–
2002 associated with the education-related tax credits was 30% less 
than the JCT originally estimated.285  Even if taxpayers knew about 
some of the education related tax provisions, they may not have 
known about all of them.  Although there are five tax expenditures 
for higher education described above, many more exist, including, 
inter alia, the exclusion for scholarship income,286 the parental ex-
emption for students aged eighteen to twenty-three,287 penalty-free 
withdrawals from IRAs,288 student loan interest deduction,289 and the 
exclusion of interest on qualifying educational bonds.290
Even if a family knows about the various tax benefits for higher 
education, determining eligibility is a difficult task.  Each college tax 
benefit may differ in AGI limitations and phase-out ranges, definition 
of qualifying expenses, and annual contribution limits.  In addition, 
some of the tax benefits apply on a per student basis and some tax 
benefits may apply on a per taxpayer basis.291
Once eligibility for the various programs is determined, the issue 
of choice complexity arises.292  Choosing among the programs for 
283 See Dynarski, Who Benefits, supra note 25, at 365 n.10. 
284 See discussion supra Part III.B about complexity in the financial aid needs 
analysis system. 
285 JACKSON, supra note 72, at 8. 
286 I.R.C. § 117 (2000). 
287 Id. § 152(c)(3)(A)(ii). 
288 Id. § 72(t)(2)(E), (t)(7). 
289 Id. § 221. 
290 Id. § 135. 
291 For example, the Hope credit is a per student credit while the LLC is a per 
taxpayer credit.  Compare I.R.C. § 25A(b)(1) (Hope), with I.R.C. § 25A (c)(1) (LLC). 
292 The term “choice complexity” is derived from an article by Albert J. Davis, a 
Ways and Means Committee member in 2002, devoted to describing in detail the is-
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which a family is eligible in order to maximize the total benefit re-
ceived is challenging.  One impediment to choosing the optimum 
mix of college tax expenditures derives from the fact that the subsidy 
values of the individual tax exceptions are calculated differently.  For 
example, the college tax credits reduce tax payable on a dollar-for-
dollar basis, whereas the subsidy value of the education-related de-
ductions and exclusions is calculated by multiplying the amount of 
the deduction/exclusion by the taxpayer’s marginal tax rate.  This 
difference may not be readily apparent to the average taxpayer.  
Compounding this problem is the fact that all or a part of the subsidy 
associated with the education-related tax credits may be recaptured 
under the alternative minimum tax system.293
Choice complexity is amplified by the fact that Congress enacted 
coordinating provisions designed to prevent a taxpayer from obtain-
ing multiple tax exceptions for any given dollar of higher education 
expense.  For example, eligible expenses for purposes of the higher 
education deduction must be reduced by the amount of those ex-
penses covered by the earnings portion of any tax-free distribution 
from a 529 plan or Coverdell savings account. 294 A similar provision 
prevents a taxpayer from using the same dollar of higher education 
expense to support an education credit and a tax-free distribution 
from a college savings plan.295  Still another provision prevents a fam-
ily from claiming a higher education deduction in any year that an 
education credit is claimed.296
The coordinating provisions between the tax-favored college sav-
ings plans are equally complex.  Prior to 2001, a 6% excise tax was 
imposed on contributions to a Coverdell account if the contributions 
were made by anyone to a 529 plan for the benefit of the same bene-
ficiary in the same year, and vice versa.297 EGTRRA repealed that ex-
cise tax, and now contributions can be made to both types of plans 
for the benefit of the same beneficiary in the same year.298  However, 
sue of complexity at the taxpayer level with regard to choosing among the various tax 
programs for higher education.  See Albert J. Davis, Choice Complexity in Tax Benefits for 
Higher Education, 55 NAT’L TAX J. 509 (2002). 
293 Id. at 512; see also Long, supra note 233, at 110. 
294 I.R.C. § 222(c)(2)(B) (2000 Supp. I). 
295 Id. §§ 529(c)(3)(B)(v), 530(d)(2)(C)(i). 
296 Id. § 222(c)(2)(A). 
297 STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX 
LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE 107TH CONGRESS—BLUE BOOK, at 37 (2003), available at 
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/Documents.asp?section=8 (follow link to report). 
298 Note that this provision effectively writes the annual contribution limit on 
Coverdell accounts out of the Internal Revenue Code if a family is willing to set up 
both a 529 plan and a Coverdell account for the same beneficiary. 
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if distributions from a 529 plan and a Coverdell account on behalf of 
the same beneficiary are made in a single year, and those distribu-
tions exceed the beneficiary’s qualified higher education expenses 
for that year (after a reduction for the expenses covered by the edu-
cation credits), the excess expenses must be allocated among the dis-
tributions to determine the amount excludable under each provi-
sion.299  This opaque matrix of coordinating provisions, combined 
with differences in eligibility criteria and in the calculation of subsidy 
value, makes it difficult for taxpayers to choose the most beneficial 
mix of tax benefits. 
An additional type of choice complexity unique to 529 plans is 
directly related to the overwhelming number of programs available to 
families.  Every state and the District of Columbia now offer a college 
savings 529 plan, and fourteen states and a consortium of institutions 
offer prepaid 529 plans.300  There are significant substantive differ-
ences among the various plans.  For example, 529 plans can differ in , 
the availability of a state income tax deduction, residency require-
ments, fees, minimum and maximum contribution amounts, refund 
policies, and the availability of a state guarantee on the rate of return 
in prepaid plans.301  It is a Herculean task to determine at the time 
the account is created (which may be eighteen years before the funds 
will actually be used), which plan offers the best combination of 
benefits for a particular family. 
Choice complexity is also affected by the temporary nature and 
uncertain future of several of the tax provisions enacted under 
EGTRRA.  All of the higher education tax benefits enacted under 
EGTTRA are subject to the sunset provision of that Act,302 and will 
automatically expire on their own terms on December 31, 2010 
unless an intervening Congress extends them.303  Additionally, as 
originally enacted, the deduction for qualified higher education ex-
penses was a temporary provision applicable to tax years 2002–2007 
299 I.R.C. §§ 529(c)(3)(B)(vi), 530(d)(2)(C)(ii) (2000 Supp. I). 
300 For a complete listing of individual states’ plans, see Savingforcollege.com, 529 
Plans, http://www.savingforcollege.com/529_plan_details/ (last visited Mar. 3, 
2007). 
301 See generally LEVINE, supra note 275, 18–46 (chart detailing state level variances 
in 529 plans). 
302 Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-
16, § 901(a), 115 Stat. 38, 150 (2001) (providing that “[a]ll provisions of, and 
amendments made by, this Act shall not apply (1) to taxable, plan, or limitation years 
beginning after December 31, 2010”).
303 Note that the Pension Protection Act of 2006 made the tax benefits of 529 
plans enacted under EGTRRA permanent.  Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 1304, 120 Stat. 
780, 1109 (2006). 
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only.304  Although this provision was recently extended through 2007, 
its future remains uncertain.305
The final level of complexity is at the system-wide level.  Deliver-
ing these educational subsidies through the tax system, rather than 
through traditional aid channels, shifts the responsibility for their 
administration and enforcement from the DOE to the IRS.306  The 
IRS lacks the expertise in the higher education area that the DOE 
possesses.  As a result, the IRS relies heavily on third party reporting 
by various institutions, including colleges and universities, state agen-
cies, and financial intermediaries to ensure that eligibility require-
ments are met and that the anti-double dipping rules are not vio-
lated.  Much of the information requested of these third parties by 
the IRS is already in the possession of the DOE, resulting in duplica-
tion of efforts and burdens.307
V. TREATMENT OF TAX BENEFITS UNDER THE 
FEDERAL METHODOLOGY
In the previous section, the tax benefits for higher education 
were analyzed in isolation under the norms of equity, efficiency and 
complexity.  These college tax expenditures for higher education do 
not operate in a vacuum.  They interact with Title IV through the FM.  
This interaction adds to the complexity of Title IV and detracts from 
its overall progressiveness. 
As previously described, eligibility for need-based financial aid 
under Title IV is based on a family’s demonstrated financial need.  
Under the FM, need is determined by subtracting from the cost of at-
tendance the student’s EFC.308  The EFC is the amount that the fed-
eral government expects the family to contribute from its own in-
come and assets before any federal financial assistance will be 
available.  In effect, the FM assesses the income and assets of the fam-
ily in order to determine their level of unmet need. 
Recall that the EFC assessment rates for income are applied to a 
base called “available income,” which is defined as “total income” less 
certain allowances, including one for federal income taxes payable.309
Recall also that the starting point for calculating “total income” is 
304 See I.R.C. § 222(e) (2000 Supp. I). 
305 Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 101, 120 Stat. 
2922 (2006).
306 See SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 228, at 106. 
307 JACKSON, supra note 72, at 21. 
308 See supra Part III.B. 
309 See supra notes 125–38 and accompanying text. 
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AGI.  By defining “available income” with reference to AGI and fed-
eral taxes payable, the FM inherently incorporates into its base for as-
sessment the effects of any tax preference items that affect AGI 
and/or federal income taxes payable.  The tax benefits for higher 
education are included in those tax preference items. 
It is important to understand the income tax effect of the various 
tax incentives for higher education before attempting to compre-
hend how those income tax effects are incorporated into the federal 
financial aid formula.  The deduction for qualified tuition and re-
lated expenses reduces a taxpayer’s AGI by the amount deducted.310
Reducing AGI by the amount of the education-related deduction in 
turn reduces the amount of federal income taxes payable.  The actual 
amount of the reduction in taxes payable is equal to the amount of 
the reduction in AGI multiplied by the taxpayer’s marginal income 
tax rate.311  To summarize, claiming an education-related tax deduc-
tion causes a simultaneous decrease in AGI and a smaller decrease in 
income taxes payable.  The exclusion of earnings on tax-favored col-
lege savings plans has a similar simultaneous effect on a taxpayer’s 
AGI and federal income tax payable.312
Since the EFC uses “available income” as its assessment tax base, 
and since “available income” is defined by reference to AGI and the 
amount of federal taxes payable, the dual income tax effects of claim-
ing an education-related tax deduction or exclusion (decrease in 
AGI, decrease in federal taxes payable) will be captured by the FM.  A 
reduction in AGI, for income tax purposes, resulting from claiming a 
higher education-related deduction or exclusion will result in a con-
comitant reduction in “available income” under the EFC formula.  
Simultaneously, the reduction in income taxes payable resulting from 
claiming an education-related deduction or exclusion will cause a 
smaller increase in “available income,” since income taxes payable is 
an offset to “available income” under the FM.  The net effect is an 
overall decrease in “available income” under the EFC calculation.  
This will result in a proportionate decrease in the family’s EFC, which 
310 I.R.C. § 62(a)(18) (2000 Supp. I).  Under these sections, the deduction for 
qualified tuition and related expenses is “above the line,” or allowable against gross 
income in arriving at AGI.  Id. 
311 This calculation becomes more complicated if, as a result of the change in 
AGI, the taxpayer’s marginal rate bracket changes.  For simplicity’s sake, I assume 
that the reduction in AGI does not change the taxpayer’s marginal rate bracket. 
312 The effect on AGI of an exclusion from income is equivalent to inclusion of 
the same amount in gross income coupled with a deduction allowable in arriving at 
AGI. 
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will increase its eligibility for need-based Title IV student aid.313  It is 
worth reflecting on this result—the receipt of a non-need-based fed-
eral higher education subsidy in the form of a tax deduction or ex-
clusion will increase a family’s eligibility for need-based federal higher 
educational subsidies under Title IV.  For example, all else being 
equal, a parent of a dependent student who is otherwise in the 28% 
marginal income tax bracket that claims the maximum deduction for 
tuition and related expenses in 2006 of $4,000 will see the student’s 
EFC decrease by as much as $1,354 resulting in an equal increase in 
the student’s eligibility for need-based aid under Title IV in 2007.314
While an education-related tax deduction or exclusion simulta-
neously affects AGI and income tax payable, an education-related tax 
credit affects only income taxes payable by reducing such amount on 
a dollar-for-dollar basis by the amount of the credit claimed.  Since 
federal income taxes payable operate as a direct offset to “total in-
come” in arriving at “available income” under the EFC, any decrease 
in income taxes payable caused by claiming an education-related tax 
credit should cause an equal increase in “available income.”  The re-
sulting proportionate increase in the family’s EFC should reduce its 
eligibility for need-based aid under Title IV.  However, the expected 
result is foreclosed by a provision in the HEA that specifically pre-
vents the amount of an education-related tax credit from being taken 
into account as an asset or income of either the parent or student in 
calculating the EFC.315  As a result, claiming an education credit will 
313 The amount of the actual decrease in the EFC will depend on the assessment 
rate applied to total income under the FM, which in turn depends on whether the 
students’ or parents’ EFC is being calculated.  A $1.00 decrease in total income of 
the student will result in a $.50 decrease in EFC.  See supra note 141 and accompany-
ing text.  A $1.00 decrease in the total income of the parent will result in a $.22 to 
$.47 decrease in EFC, depending on the marginal assessment rate applied to the 
parent’s total income under the FM.  See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
314 Total income is decreased by $4,000.  Federal tax payable is decreased by 
$1,120 (28% of $4,000).  Accordingly, the net change on available income is $2,880 
($4,000–$1,120).  Assuming the parent’s available income is subject to the highest 
marginal rate under the FM of 47%, the net decrease in EFC would be $1,354 (47% 
of $2,880).  There is a possibility that the amount of any education-related income 
tax deduction or exclusion could be treated as an item of untaxed income that is 
added to total income in arriving at available income.  However, neither Congress 
nor the DOE currently requires this treatment, possibly because of the complexity 
involved in actually accounting for the combined income tax effects of these tax ex-
penditures under the FM.  Also, given the preferred treatment of the education-
related tax credits under the FM, a good argument can be made that Congress in-
tended these tax benefits for higher education to be in addition to Title IV aid.  
Therefore, excluding them from consideration as an item of untaxed income under 
the FM seems proper. 
315 20 U.S.C. § 1087vv(a)(2) (2000). 
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not reduce a family’s eligibility for need-based aid compared to what 
it would have been had the credit not been claimed.316
The effect of claiming an education-related tax credit on eligibil-
ity for need-based Title IV aid should be compared to the effect of 
claiming an earned income tax credit (EITC).  The EITC is refund-
able tax credit that operates as a wage supplement to low-income 
working families.  The largest beneficiaries of EITC dollars are fami-
lies with children earning under $35,000.317  Since 84% of Pell grant 
recipients are from families earning $40,000 or less, there is substan-
tial overlap in the population receiving the EITC and the Pell grant.  
The EFC formula, which determines eligibility for a Pell grant, re-
quires the amount of any EITC to be added back to AGI as an item of 
untaxed income subject to assessment under the FM.318  Thus, a low-
income family will see its eligibility for Title IV need-based aid de-
crease as a result of claiming an EITC, while a middle-income family 
will realize no adverse impact on eligibility for Title IV need-based aid 
as a result of claiming an education-related credit.  This is a particu-
larly harsh result given the fact many lower-income families, who do 
not have enough positive tax liability to claim an aid system advan-
taged education-related credit, will be able to claim an aid system dis-
advantaged EITC because of its refund feature. 
To summarize, claiming an income tax deduction or exclusion 
for higher education increases eligibility for need-based aid under Ti-
tle IV, while claiming an education-related income tax credit is neu-
tral with regard to eligibility for need-based aid.  With regard to the 
effect of the education-related credits, this was clearly the intended 
result.  A 1998 letter sent by the DOE explicitly expressed the admini-
stration’s view that the amount of any education-related credit 
claimed should not displace any Title IV need-based aid.319
316 The EFC formula technically gets to this result by reducing AGI by the amount 
of the credit claimed, effectively treating the amount of the credit as an item of tax-
able income that is excluded from available income when calculating the EFC.  FSA
HANDBOOK, supra note 123, at 17–18 (requiring the amount of any education credit 
to be listed on Worksheet C Excluded Income). 
317 ALAN BERUBE, THE NEW SAFETY NET: HOW THE TAX CODE HELPED LOW-INCOME 
FAMILIES DURING THE EARLY 2000S, at 2 (2006), http://www.brookings.edu/metro 
/pubs/eitc/20060209_newsafety.pdf. 
318 20 U.S.C. § 1087vv(b)(8) (2000). 
319 Letter ANN-98-16 from Richard W. Riley (December 1998), available at
http://ifap.ed.gov/dpcletters/doc0497_bodyoftext.htm.  Specifically, the letter 
stated that   
[i]n developing these tax credits, we wanted to ensure that they would 
provide additional help for families to pay for college and not simply sub-
stitute for existing sources of financial assistance.  At the Federal level, we 
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However, the aid eligibility effect of claiming a deduction for 
higher education expenses is probably a result of legislative oversight 
rather than explicit legislative intent.  Considering that Congress en-
acted the deduction for higher education expenses as an alternative 
to either of the education-related credits for those families whose AGI 
exceeded the income thresholds, the difference in aid eligibility ef-
fects between the two types of tax subsidies seems irreconcilable.  Fur-
thermore, if you account for the difference in distributional impact, 
the result seems somewhat perverse.  The majority of the benefits of 
the deduction for higher education expenses accrue to families with 
cash incomes between $100,000 and $200,000, whereas the majority 
of the benefits of the Hope credit and LLC accrue to families with 
cash incomes between $50,000 and $100,000.320  With regard to eligi-
bility for Title IV aid, it would be difficult to ascribe to Congress an 
explicit legislative intent to advantage higher-income families claim-
ing the tuition and fees deduction over relatively lower-income fami-
lies claiming the education-related credits.  However, the lack of co-
ordination between the various programs under the two systems of 
federal college financial aid results in exactly this outcome. 
As indicated above, Congress intended the tax deduction and 
credits for higher education to be in addition to any amounts of fi-
nancial aid available under Title IV.  While it is true that the amount 
of any education-related credit or deduction claimed under the tax 
system will not reduce eligibility for a Pell grant under Title IV (it 
may even increase it), the converse is not also true.  The amount of a 
Pell grant received under Title IV will reduce on a dollar-for-dollar 
basis the amount of expenses eligible to be claimed as a tuition credit 
or deduction.321  In one sense, it makes sense to disallow a double 
federal subsidy for a single dollar of higher education expense.  
However, this rationale would apply only if the higher education ex-
did not want to force any student to lose a Pell Grant, for example, as a 
result of benefiting from a tax credit.  Consequently, . . . Congress en-
acted . . . a change to the eligibility formulas to ensure that receipt of a . . 
. tax credit would not reduce any student’s eligibility for Federal student 
financial assistance. 
Id. 
320 Burman et al., supra note 25, at tbls. 3–5; see id. at tbl. 3 (for a definition of cash 
income). 
321 See I.R.C. § 25A(g)(2)(A) (2000) (requiring a reduction in the amount of 
qualified tuition and related expenses by the amount of any qualified scholarship ex-
cludable from gross income under I.R.C. § 117, which would include a Pell grant); see 
also id. § 222(d)(1) (2000 Supp. I) (incorporating by reference the definition of 
qualified tuition and related expenses from the educational credits, including the 
offset for the amount of any Pell grant received). 
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penses covered by a Pell grant are identical to those covered by the 
education-related credits.  In fact, they differ.  Pell grants cover a 
wide range of expenses included in the cost of attendance, including, 
inter alia, books, supplies, transportation, and room and board.322
On the other hand, the education-related credits and deduction are 
allowed only with respect to tuition and fees.323  To see the potential 
problem this creates consider this example.  Assume that the cost of 
attending a university is $2,000, with $1,000 representing tuition and 
$1,000 representing room and board.  A student who qualifies for a 
$500 Pell grant will only have $500 in expenses eligible for an educa-
tion-related tax credit after accounting for the amount of the Pell 
grant.  In effect, the income tax rules assume that a Pell grant is ap-
plied first to reduce tuition, before offsetting any other higher educa-
tion expenses.  If the education-related credits and deduction were 
truly a supplement to Title IV aid, the amount of a Pell grant should 
be applied first to expenses not otherwise covered by the education-
related credits or deduction.  In the example, the student would get a 
$500 Pell grant and would have $1,000 in qualifying tuition expenses 
eligible for the Hope credit or LLC.  Congress could also choose to 
deal with this problem by adopting the same definition of qualifying 
expenses under both the tax system and Title IV. 
The education-related tax deduction and credits are not the only 
college tax expenditures that interact with Title IV under the FM.  
Since the EFC formula assesses not only the income but also the as-
sets of a family with a student in college, the income-tax-advantaged 
educational savings vehicles also potentially interact with the FM.  
There has been inconsistency over time, and across savings vehicles, 
as to how to treat the asset balances in these plans under the federal 
needs analysis. 
Prior to 2006, Congress statutorily prescribed the federal meth-
odology’s treatment of only prepaid 529 plans.  For all of the other 
education-related savings vehicles, it left the difficult policy questions 
about their proper treatment under the expected family contribution 
formula to the DOE.  The original HEA rule with regard to prepaid 
529 plans required the amount of any distribution from such a plan 
to be treated as offsetting the cost of attendance under the FM on a 
dollar-for-dollar basis,324 thereby reducing the qualified beneficiary’s 
322 See 20 U.S.C. § 1087ll (2000) (giving a complete listing of the expenses allowed 
in calculating the COA). 
323 See I.R.C §§ 25A (g)(2)(A), 222(d)(1) (2000 Supp. I). 
324 20 U.S.C. § 1087vv(j) (2000); see also Letter GEN-04-02 from Sally Stroup, Assis-
tant Sec’y for Postsecondary Educ. to Colleagues (Jan. 22, 2004) (describing treat-
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eligibility for need-based Title IV aid by the dollar amount of the pre-
paid 529 plan distribution.325  The prepaid 529 plan balance itself was 
not further assessed as an asset by the FM.326
With regard to Coverdell accounts, the DOE originally took the 
position that these accounts should be treated as an asset of the bene-
ficiary-student in calculating the student’s EFC under the FM.327  This 
treatment by the FM resulted in the balance in a Coverdell account 
reducing a student’s eligibility for need-based Title IV aid at rate of 
35% per year.328  In addition, since there was no asset protection al-
lowance applied to a student’s contribution from assets under the 
EFC formula, the entire balance of a Coverdell account was subject to 
assessment.329
Prior to 2006, the DOE treated 529 savings plans (as opposed to 
529 prepaid plans) as assets of the account owner, which were en-
tered into the calculation of a student’s EFC only if the student or 
parent were the owner.330  The FM treated a student-owned 529 sav-
ings plan identically to a Coverdell account.  On the other hand, a 
parent-owned 529 savings plan was assessed by the EFC formula at the 
more favorable parental asset rates.331  Accordingly, the balance in a 
parent-owned 529 savings plan was subject to a maximum assessment 
rate of only 5.64% per year.332  In addition to a lower marginal as-
sessment rate, the effective assessment rate applied to a parent-owned 
529 savings plan was even lower because of the availability of an asset 
protection allowance.333  In addition, a 529 savings plan for the bene-
fit of a student could avoid assessment by the FM if a grandparent or 
other relative owned the account. 
ment of 529 prepaid plans under FM), available at http://www.ifap.ed.gov/ 
dpcletters/GEN0402.html. 
325 Recall that under the FM, need is equal to COA less the EFC.  Accordingly, re-
ducing the COA by the amount of the prepaid 529 plan distribution resulted in an 
exactly equivalent reduction in need.  See generally LINDA LEVINE & CHARMAINE 
MERCER, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, TAX FAVORED HIGHER EDUCATION SAVINGS BENEFITS 
AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO TRADITIONAL FEDERAL AID, 2006, at 21–28 (2006). 
326 FSA HANDBOOK, supra note 123, at 20. 
327 See 2001–2002 FEDERAL STUDENT AID HANDBOOK, APPLICATION AND VERIFICATION 
GUIDE 22 (2001), available at http://www.ifap.ed.gov/sfahandbooks/attachments 
/0102AVGCh2appquestions.pdf [hereinafter FSA HANDBOOK 2001–2002] (providing 
that Education IRAs should be treated as an asset of the student).
328 See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
329 See note 142. 
330 See, e.g., FSA HANDBOOK 2001–2002, supra note 327, at 23; Letter from Stroup, 
supra note 324. 
331 See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
332 See id.
333 See supra notes 133–34 and accompanying text. 
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In early 2004, the DOE changed course regarding the treatment 
of Coverdell accounts by the FM.  In a “Dear Colleague” letter to all 
financial aid officers, the DOE provided a “clarification on the treat-
ment of . . . educational savings plans in the determination of . . . eli-
gibility for Federal student aid.”334  The letter indicated that Coverdell 
accounts would be treated the same as 529 savings plans under the 
FM.335  As a result, the asset balances in Coverdell accounts education 
savings plans were treated as an asset of the account owner in calcu-
lating the student’s EFC.  This allowed parent-owned Coverdell ac-
counts to enjoy the lower assessment rate and the asset protection al-
lowance normally applied to parental assets under the EFC.  The 
difference in treatment between prepaid 529 plans, on the one hand, 
and college savings 529 plans and Coverdell accounts, on the other 
hand, remained. 
Under HERA 2005, Congress fixed this anomaly by repealing the 
provisions of Title IV that treated distributions from prepaid 529 
plans as offsetting the COA on a dollar-for-dollar basis.336  Congress 
also provided that no matter who owned the account, the asset value 
in a tax-favored college savings plan would not be considered as an 
asset of a dependent student under the FM.337  These two changes 
removed the historical competitive disadvantages of prepaid 529 
plans as compared to 529 savings plans and Coverdell accounts.  Ac-
cording to the DOE, the net result of these changes with regard to 
dependent students is that the only way the value of an income-tax 
advantaged college savings plan would be included in the calculation 
of a student’s EFC is if the parent were the account owner.338
While Congress aligned the treatment of all types of tax-favored 
college savings plans under Title IV, questions still remain as to 
whether the current treatment is the proper one.  The most glaring 
problem with the statutorily-prescribed treatment of college savings 
plans under the FM is the ability to completely escape assessment by 
simply naming a grandparent, other relative, or close advisor as the 
account owner.  Escaping assessment means that the college savings 
334 Letter from Stroup, supra note 324. 
335 Id.
336 20 U.S.C.A. § 1087vv(f)(5) (West 2006) (creating a new category of assets 
named qualified education benefits and including in that category both types of 529 
plans and Coverdell accounts). 
337 Id. § 1087vv(f)(3). 
338 Letter GEN-06-05 from Susan Beaudoin, Office of Postsecondary Educ.,  and 
Theresa S. Shaw, Chief Operating Officer Fed. Student Aid (April 2006) (discussing 
changes made by HERA 2005 to certain provisions of Title IV of the HEA), available 
at http://www.ifap.ed.gov/dpcletters/GEN0605.html. 
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plan balance, no matter how large, will not be counted as a resource 
available to be put towards the student’s higher education expenses 
under the FM.  This leads to inequities in the overall distribution of 
Title IV funds.  Consider two students, each with equal amounts of 
family income and wealth, both of whom are applying for Title IV 
need-based aid in order to attend the same four-year public under-
graduate institution.  However, one student is the beneficiary of a 
grandparent-owned 529 plan with a balance of $11,000.339  Under the 
current rules, both students will qualify for the same amount of Title 
IV need-based aid, despite the fact that the 529 plan beneficiary’s ac-
tual need is less than the other student’s need.340
Perhaps this should not be considered too much of an equity 
problem because any Title IV need-based aid claimed will displace 
the 529 funds and leave a balance remaining in the account upon 
matriculation, necessitating a non-qualifying distribution incurring 
an income and penalty tax.341  The response to this argument is three-
fold.  First, in the event that excess funds remain in the 529 plan 
upon matriculation, the liberal rollover and change in beneficiary 
rules for 529 plans would allow the grandparent to rollover the ac-
count balance to another grandchild’s account or simply name an-
other grandchild as beneficiary to avoid the consequences of a non-
qualifying distribution.342 Additionally, even if a rollover or benefici-
339 The average account balance in a college savings 529 plan in 2006 was $10,569.  
TRENDS IN STUDENT AID 2006, supra note 2, at 24 fig. 15. 
340 One criticism of this example is that it is unlikely to occur because a student 
with a 529 plan balance this large would probably come from a wealthy family and 
would not qualify for need-based Title IV aid.  While this may be true with regard to 
Pell grant recipients, it is not true with regard to subsidized federal student loan re-
cipients.  In 2003–2004, 24.5% of dependent students from families with incomes be-
tween $80,000 and $99,999, and 11.2% of dependent students from families with in-
comes over $100,000, received subsidized federal student loans.  BERKNER ET AL.,
supra note 109, at 14 tbl. 5. 
341 This would occur under the facts as given under several reasonable assump-
tions.  If we assume the student attended a public four-year institution as an in-state 
resident where the average cost of attendance was $16,357 per year in 2005–2006, the 
student would need a total of $65,428 to cover his total cost of attendance over a 
four-year period.  TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING 2006, supra note 96, at 6 fig. 2.  In addi-
tion, if we assume the dependent undergraduate student received the 2003–2004 av-
erage amount of federal loans, grants, and work-study awards, then Title IV aid 
would amount to $9,500 per year, or $38,000 over a four-year period.  STUDENT 
FINANCIAL AID ESTIMATES, supra note 109, at 5.  The sum of Title IV aid plus the 529 
plan balance would be $49,000.  Under these average assumptions, there would be 
$16,428 remaining in the 529 plan at the end of the four years, assuming the grand-
parent requires the student to exhaust his or her Title IV aid before 529 plan distri-
butions would be made. 
342 See supra notes 206–08 and accompanying text. 
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ary change is not possible, a penalty tax may not apply because of the 
exception for a distribution on account of a scholarship or other al-
lowance.343  Lastly, even if an income and penalty tax is imposed on 
the 529 plan beneficiary, it does not help the other student whose 
share of Title IV need-based aid was less because of having to share 
the limited pool of federal Title IV funds with the 529 plan benefici-
ary. 
It is also not clear that an income and penalty tax overcomes the 
exclusion of the asset from assessment under Title IV in the first in-
stance.  These tax-favored savings plans represent funds specifically 
set aside to pay for the designated beneficiary’s postsecondary educa-
tion expenses.  It seems odd that the FM does not count these assets 
as resources available to be put towards this very purpose.  While the 
exemption of home equity and retirement assets from assessment 
under Title IV may be justified by a balancing of conflicting federal 
policies with regard to encouraging education, home ownership, and 
retirement savings, no such conflicting policy exists with regard to 
college savings plans.  Indeed, the income tax exemption granted to 
these plans is premised on the funds being actually put towards the 
payment of higher education expenses.  Title IV should further this 
income tax policy by capturing the balances in college savings plans 
under the EFC formula as assets available to pay for college. 
VI. CONSOLIDATION AND COORDINATION
This Part illustrates that significant equity, efficiency, and sim-
plicity gains in the overall distribution of federal higher education 
dollars can be realized by consolidating substantially similar college 
tax programs and by coordinating the benefits provided under both 
tax and transfer systems to achieve an overall progressive distribution 
in federal higher education dollars. 
A. Consolidation 
1. Grant-Like Tax Programs 
The Hope scholarship credit, the LLC, and the higher education 
tax deduction all operate as tuition subsidies reimbursing families for 
tuition payments previously made.  These substantially similar grant-
like higher education tax programs should be consolidated into a 
343 See I.R.C. §§ 529(d)(6), 530(d)(4)(B)(iii) (2000 Supp. I) (note the exception 
to penalty taxation only applies “to the extent the amount of the payment or distri-
bution does not exceed the amount of the scholarship, allowance, or payment”). 
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single refundable college tax credit with an advance payment fea-
ture.344  This type of tax subsidy would be distributionally superior to 
the existing education-related credits and deduction.  Furthermore, a 
single refundable college tax credit with an advance payment mecha-
nism is more likely than any of the existing tuition tax subsidies to 
further the dual public policy goals of increased access and afforda-
bility in higher education.345  Lastly, a consolidated college tax credit 
will reduce choice complexity at the taxpayer level. 
Similar to its nonrefundable brethren, a refundable tax credit 
reduces income tax payable on a dollar-for-dollar basis regardless of 
the taxpayer’s marginal income tax rate bracket.346  This avoids the 
regressive distribution of benefits associated with the tuition tax de-
duction.347  However, a refundable tax credit goes further, delivering 
its subsidy to an eligible family regardless of the existence or level of 
income tax payable.348  After reducing income tax to zero, a family 
with excess credit eligibility would receive a cash payment from the 
government in the amount of such excess.349  Disconnecting the level 
of the subsidy from the amount of income tax owed mitigates the dis-
tributional defects associated with the Hope credit and the LLC.350
Recall that to be most effective, higher education subsidies 
should be targeted at the most price-sensitive and underrepresented 
college student population, that is, lower-income students.351  Title IV 
attempts to target its need-based financial aid programs in this man-
ner.352  To capture Title IV’s preferred progressive distribution pat-
tern, the maximum refundable education tax credit amount should 
344 See Susan Dynarski & Judith Scott-Clayton, Simplify and Focus the Education Tax 
Incentives, 111 TAX NOTES 1290 (June 12, 2006) (arguing for a similar single, refund-
able tax credit delivered at the time of college enrollment). 
345 Although this Article speaks of efficiency in terms of the ability of the college 
tax expenditures to achieve their stated public policy goals, a recent article made a 
strong economic efficiency argument for using a uniform refundable tax credit as 
the default form of tax incentive when the goal of the government in enacting the 
tax provision is to induce socially desirable behavior generating positive externalities.  
See Batchelder et al., supra note 230. 
346 See supra notes 232–33 and accompanying text. 
347 See supra notes 228–30 and accompanying text. 
348 SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 228, at 109–110 (recognizing that refundable 
credits would allow nontaxpayers to participate in tax expenditure programs but ar-
guing that if the credit amount itself is not taxable, then an additional tax expendi-
ture arises, which “will have the same upside-down effect as a deduction or exclu-
sion”). 
349 Id.
350 See supra notes 233–40 and accompanying text. 
351 See supra Part II.C. 
352 See supra Part III.B. 
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decrease incrementally as family income increases, with benefits phas-
ing out up to a predetermined AGI level.353  An AGI cap would pre-
vent windfalls to higher-income taxpayers who would have attended 
college anyway with or without the subsidy.354
Furthermore, to address the timing disadvantage associated with 
the current tuition tax credits, the new refundable college tax credit 
should offer an advance payment option.355  Recall that the current 
education-related tax credits and deduction operate as reimburse-
ments for tuition payments previously made.356  These subsidies sim-
ply come too late to meaningfully impact the college enrollment de-
cisions of families lacking the financial wherewithal to pay tuition 
payments as they fall due.  An advance payment feature would allow a 
family to claim the subsidy at the time the tuition bill is due and pay-
able, rather than waiting until April 15th of the following year.  This 
enhances the ability of the new college tax credit to induce enroll-
ment in students from liquidity constrained families.  Both the 
EITC357 and health coverage tax credit358 currently offer an advance 
payment mechanism. 
353 See Batchelder et al., supra note 230, at 27–28 (arguing that uniform refund-
able tax credits are more economically efficient with regard to tax incentives in-
tended to encourage behavior generating positive externalities but conceding that 
non-uniform tax credits may be justified if there are “differences in externalities and 
elasticities by income class”). 
354 Although this would create steep marginal combined tax and transfer rates in 
the consolidated college tax credit phase-out range, such a result is observed in all 
income-tested transfer programs.  See Alstott, supra note 255, at 550 (providing 
graphic illustration of the increase in marginal rates at different income levels that 
results in the phase-out range of the earned income tax credit in a hypothetical com-
bined tax and transfer fiscal system). 
355 See Dynarski & Scott-Clayton, supra note 344. 
356 See supra notes 267–68 and accompanying text. 
357 I.R.C. § 32 (2000).  The earned income credit advance payment feature allows 
taxpayers to receive the credit amount over the course of the year in their regular 
paychecks through reduced withholding.  Id. § 3507.  However, the advance payment 
feature is rarely utilized.  In 1998, only 1.1% of EITC recipients used the advance 
payment option.  Joseph Hotz & John Karl Scholz, The Earned Income Tax Credit, in
MEANS-TESTED TRANSFER PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 58 (Robert A. Moffitt ed., 
2003), cited in David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending 
Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 1022 (2004); see also George K. Yin et al., Improving the De-
livery of Benefits to the Working Poor: Proposals to Reform the Earned Income Tax Credit Pro-
gram, 11 AM. J. OF TAX POL’Y 225, 257–58 (1994) (discussing of the possible causes of 
the low take-up rate for the advance EITC). 
358 I.R.C. § 35 (2000 Supp. II).  The health coverage tax credit, enacted in 2002, is 
a refundable tax credit equal to 65% of the cost for coverage under a qualified 
health insurance plan for certain eligible individuals.  Id. § 35(a).  Under the ad-
vance payment option, the federal government pays 65% of the health insurance 
premium each month directly to the insurer.  See generally Health Coverage Tax 
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To make college more affordable, a financial subsidy must 
meaningfully affect net price, including all relevant costs.  Qualified 
expenses for purposes of the education-related tax credits and deduc-
tion include only tuition and fees.359  Title IV, on the other hand, al-
lows its grants to subsidize the entire cost of attendance, including 
room, board, books, transportation expenses, etc.360  All of these costs 
factor into a student’s cost-benefit analysis when making the enroll-
ment decision.  Accordingly, in order to enhance the ability of the 
consolidated refundable college tax credit to increase college atten-
dance by decreasing cost, the new tax credit should adopt Title IV’s 
expanded definition of COA.361  Harmonization of the definition of 
qualified expenses should also avoid certain anomalies associated 
with the interaction between the two systems when differing eligible 
expense definitions apply.362
Simplicity gains can be realized by reducing choice complexity 
faced by taxpayers in determining which of the current tuition tax 
subsidies for which they are eligible provides the greatest benefit.363
Recall that the tuition tax deduction and the tuition tax credits have 
different AGI limitations.364  Additionally, the subsidy value of the tui-
tion tax deduction is calculated differently from that of the tuition 
tax credits.365  Furthermore, the maximum Hope scholarship amount 
is determined under a different formula than the maximum LLC 
amount.366  A single refundable college tax credit with a uniform set 
of eligibility criteria and a single subsidy value and maximum amount 
would be less complex than the current matrix of tuition tax subsidy 
rules.  Simple financial aid programs are the ones most likely to affect 
access.367
Credit (HCTC) Overview, available at http://www.irs.gov/individuals/article/0,,id= 
109960,00.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2007). 
359 See supra note 169 and accompanying text (listing eligible expenses for pur-
poses of Hope credit, LLC, and tuition deduction). 
360 See supra note 121 and accompanying text (defining COA under FM which de-
termines Pell grant eligibility). 
361 Using the same definition of qualified higher education expenses under the 
tax system and Title IV would enhance their compatibility and allow better coordina-
tion between the two systems. 
362 See supra notes 321–23 and accompanying text. 
363 See supra Part IV.B.3. 
364 Compare supra note 176 and accompanying text, with note 187 and accompany-
ing text. 
365 Compare supra note 228 and accompanying text, with notes 232–33 and accom-
panying text. 
366 Compare supra note 173 and accompanying text, with note 178 and accompany-
ing text. 
367 Dynarski & Scott-Clayton, supra note 147, at 319–20. 
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2. Tax-Favored Savings Programs 
Currently, college savers must choose between investing in a 529 
plan or a Coverdell account.  Both types of college savings options of-
fer federal tax advantages designed to induce more college savings.  
However, the form of the tax exception, an exclusion from income 
for earnings on plan balances, provides the largest benefits to the 
wealthiest taxpayers, those most likely to save even in the absence of a 
subsidy.368  Little or no tax benefit is provided to lower-income fami-
lies, those most in need of an inducement to engage in college sav-
ings.369  This result is not only distributionally problematic, but it also 
hampers the ability of these plans to achieve their public policy goal 
of increasing college savings.  Furthermore, the sheer number of col-
lege savings plan options creates choice complexity at the taxpayer 
level, which itself may prove a barrier to entry for the novice potential 
college saver.370  To address these equity, efficiency, and simplicity 
concerns, the existing college savings options should be consolidated 
into a single college savings plan with a federal match for lower-
income families.371
Consolidation of the tax-favored college savings plans into a sin-
gle college savings vehicle would simplify the savings process once the 
college savings decision was made, but it would not induce more col-
lege savings among those lower-income families, who are least likely 
to save.  In order to stimulate new college savings, contributions to 
the new consolidated college savings vehicle by low-income families 
should be accompanied by a federal match, in the form of a refund-
able tax credit deposited directly into the college savings account.  
This would allow lower-income families to realize an educational sub-
sidy from investing in tax-favored college savings plans without regard 
to their marginal income tax rate bracket.  A similar credit already ex-
ists that provides up to a $2,000 federal match for voluntary contribu-
tions to qualified retirement plans for certain qualified individuals.372
The match rate under the existing retirement saver’s credit is pro-
gressive, with the match percentage decreasing as family income in-
creases.373  A college saver’s credit with a similar design would not 
only reduce the regressivity associated with the benefit provided un-
368 See supra notes 228–29 and accompanying text; Part IV.B.2.c. 
369 See id.
370 See supra Part IV.B.3. 
371 The consolidated college savings plan could continue to allow for both prepaid 
and college savings types of accounts. 
372 I.R.C. § 25B(a) (2000 Supp. I). 
373 See id. § 25B(b). 
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der existing college savings plans but would also increase the likeli-
hood that the consolidated program would capture new college sav-
ings dollars.374  To further mitigate regressivity, AGI limitations, simi-
lar to those set forth currently for Coverdell accounts, should be 
imposed on contributors.375
A single college savings vehicle with one set of eligibility criteria 
will reduce choice complexity at the taxpayer level.  For the reasons 
cited above, the definition of eligible expenses under the new con-
solidated savings program should be identical to the definition of 
COA under Title IV.376  Coordinating provisions between the consoli-
dated savings plan and the consolidated college tax credit will still be 
needed to prevent multiple tax exceptions for the same dollar of 
higher education expense.  However, such provisions will be less ex-
tensive than those currently in place because there will only be two 
tax expenditures for higher education requiring coordination. 
Finally, annual contribution limits should apply to bring the new 
consolidated college savings plan in line with other tax-advantaged 
retirement and health care individual savings accounts.377  By impos-
ing annual contribution limits, the ability of the highest income tax-
payers to use these accounts as conduits through which to make 
transfer-tax advantaged gifts for non-educational purposes is re-
duced.378  To further ensure that the funds in these accounts are used 
for their intended purposes, the current income and penalty tax 
structure should apply to the new consolidated college savings pro-
gram.379
B. Coordination Between Tax System and Title IV 
Part V described how the current treatment by the FM of the tax 
benefits for higher education produces inequitable results with re-
gard to eligibility for need-based Title IV financial aid.  Claiming an 
education-related deduction or exclusion effectively increases eligibil-
ity for need-based Title IV aid.380  Claiming an existing tuition tax 
credit does not affect Title IV need-based aid eligibility, even though 
374 See supra Part IV.B.2.c. 
375 See supra note 227 and accompanying text. 
376 See supra notes 359–62 and accompanying text. 
377 See I.R.C. § 408(a)(1) (2000) (annual contribution limits on traditional indi-
vidual retirement accounts); id. § 408A(c)(2) (annual contribution limits on Roth 
individual retirement accounts); § 223(b) (2000 Supp. II) (annual contribution lim-
its on health savings accounts). 
378 See supra notes 245–46 and accompanying text. 
379 See supra notes 201–05, 220 and accompanying text. 
380 See supra note 313 and accompanying text. 
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under the FM it should.381  The tortured history of the Title IV treat-
ment of tax-favored college savings plans resulted in legislation that 
effectively allows families to self-exempt college savings plan balances 
from assessment under the FM.382  These anomalies are largely due to 
a lack of coordination between the benefits provided under the two 
systems; however, in some cases, it is a direct result of congressional 
coordinating directives that aid families able to claim benefits under 
both systems.  Accordingly, in order to preserve the progressivity 
gains in the distribution of federal dollars for higher education real-
ized by consolidating substantially similar tax benefits, this section de-
scribes how the consolidated educational tax subsidies should be 
treated by the FM under Title IV. 
The current education-related tax credits were intended to 
complement Title IV aid rather than displace it.383  This is an accept-
able policy goal if all families who qualify for need-based Title IV aid 
can also claim the tuition tax credits.  With regard to lower-income 
families, this is generally not the case.384  After consolidation, how-
ever, lower-income families could participate in both the refundable 
college tax credit program and Title IV need-based aid programs.  
Accordingly, it seems proper to continue to disregard the amount of 
the consolidated college tax credit for purposes of determining eligi-
bility for need-based Title IV aid under the FM.  This would increase 
the overall progressivity in the distribution of federal dollars for 
higher education, since more total student financial aid would be 
available to lower-income families.385
Furthermore, a single consolidated refundable tax credit uni-
formly ignored under Title IV will avoid the existing anomalies be-
tween the FM treatment of the higher education deduction versus the 
education-related credits.386  Under the current system, a taxpayer 
deciding between a tuition tax credit or deduction needs to account 
not only for differing subsidy values under the tax system but also for 
381 See supra notes 315–16 and accompanying text. 
382 See supra notes 324–38 and accompanying text. 
383 See supra note 319 and accompanying text. 
384 See supra notes 228–30 and accompanying text.
385 This results because lower-income families could claim the maximum refund-
able tax credit amount without negatively impacting their eligibility for Title IV need-
based aid.  Middle-income taxpayers would qualify for less Title IV aid because of 
their reduced level of financial need and may be limited in claiming the maximum 
refundable tax credit amount if they are in the phase-out range (and totally excluded 
from credit eligibility if their AGI exceeds the statutory limitation). 
386 Compare supra notes 313–14 and accompanying text, with supra notes 315–16 
and accompanying text. 
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differing treatment of each type of tax expenditure by the FM. Con-
solidation and coordination should make the post-income-tax, post-
FM-assessment, subsidy value of the consolidated college tax credit 
more transparent. 
Ignoring the new college tax credit under Title IV also harmo-
nizes its FM treatment with that of a Pell grant.  Currently, the 
amount of any Pell grant received by a student is statutorily excluded 
from consideration as income or an asset under the FM.387  Aligning 
the FM treatment of a Pell grant recipient with a consolidated college 
tax credit recipient recognizes the similarities between the two types 
of federal student aid programs.  Both are grant-like tuition subsidies 
that are simply delivered through two different distribution  
channels.388
The FM should capture the balance in a new consolidated col-
lege savings plan as an asset available to be put towards the desig-
nated beneficiary’s higher education expenses.  To recap, under the 
changes made by HERA, the balance in any type of tax-favored col-
lege savings plan is treated as an includable asset under the FM only 
if the parent is the account owner.389  For those parent-owned plans 
captured by Title IV, plan balances are assessed at an annual rate of 
5.64%, and then only if the plan balances exceed the existing asset 
387 20 U.S.C. § 1087vv(a)(2) (2000) (excluding any “portion of any student finan-
cial assistance received from any program” from the expected contribution formula 
as income or an asset).  Absent this provision, a Pell grant, which is excluded from 
gross income under I.R.C. § 117, may be considered an item of untaxed income that 
is added to the student’s AGI in arriving at student total income under the EFC for-
mula.  See supra note 128.  The result of this would be to increase available income 
and proportionately decrease eligibility for need-based Title IV aid. 
388 The similarity between Pell grants and tuition tax subsidies led Dynarski and 
Scott-Clayton to argue for consolidation of Pell grants and existing tuition tax subsi-
dies into a simple, single grant program administered through the DOE, using in-
formation supplied by the IRS.  SUSAN M. DYNARSKI & JUDITH SCOTT-CLAYTON, THE 
HAMILTON PROJECT, COLLEGE GRANTS ON A POSTCARD: A PROPOSAL FOR SIMPLE AND 
PREDICTABLE FEDERAL STUDENT AID (2007), http://www3.brookings.edu/views/pap 
ers/200702dynarski-scott-clayton_pb.pdf; see also David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, 
The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955 (2004) (arguing that 
substantially similar tax and spending programs should be integrated when such in-
tegration would result in better achievement of the public policy at issue and that the 
choice between integration into the tax system or the spending system should be a 
matter of institutional design).  But see Nancy Staudt, Redundant Tax and Spending 
Programs, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1197 (2006) (arguing that even if integration of similar 
tax and spending programs were politically possible, it may result in sole control over 
the integrated program being vested in a single Congressional committee, resulting 
in a normatively unappealing shift from a system of parallel decision-making to one 
of hierarchical decision-making).
389 See supra notes 336–38 and accompanying text. 
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protection allowance.390  An account owned by a student, non-parent 
relative, or close advisor is effectively exempted from assessment un-
der the EFC formula.  In effect, the tax system provides an exemption 
for non-parent owned college savings plans to encourage college sav-
ings but Title IV does not consider those savings as available for the 
payment of college expenses. 
The current treatment by the FM of college savings balances is 
too generous and easily manipulated.  However, if the FM required 
the entire plan balance to offset eligibility for need-based Title IV aid, 
families may refrain from investing in these plans and the goal of in-
creasing college savings would be hampered.  Accordingly, to ensure 
that Title IV captures plan balances, but not in an unduly harsh way 
that deters families from engaging in saving for college, the FM 
should treat the consolidated college savings plan as an asset of the 
designated beneficiary.  This was the original approach of the DOE 
with regard to the needs analysis treatment of Coverdell accounts.391
Under current law, this would result in plan balances being subject to 
assessment under the EFC formula at an annual rate of 20%.392  Since 
there is no asset protection allowance provided for student assets, the 
first dollars in the plan would be subject to assessment. 
Treating the new consolidated college savings plans as student 
assets under the FM would accomplish three important goals.  First, it 
would align the goals of the tax system and Title IV with regard to 
these plans.  The federal government offers an income tax exemp-
tion to these plans to encourage savings for future college expenses.  
Title IV should further this goal by capturing the value in these ac-
counts as available to be put towards their intended purpose.  Sec-
ond, it reduces the inequity associated with the current advantaged 
position these assets hold under Title IV as compared to other non-
tax advantaged forms of savings.393  Lastly, by more accurately reflect-
ing a family’s reduced level of need as a result of the existence of a 
college savings plan, it increases the overall progressivity in the distri-
bution of Title IV aid. 
390 See supra notes 249–50 and accompanying text.  This would result in a cumula-
tive assessment rate of 21% over a four-year period.  Id. 
391 See supra notes 327–29 and accompanying text. 
392 See supra note 143 and accompanying text.  This would result in a cumulative 
assessment rate on the college savings plan balance of 59% over a four-year period.  
See supra note 250 (author’s own calculation using described formula). 
393 See supra notes 339–40 and accompanying text. 
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VII. CONCLUSION
Attending college is more important and more expensive than 
ever.  For many potential college students, financial constraints re-
main a barrier to access.  Traditionally, the federal government as-
sisted college students through the progressive spending programs 
under Title IV.  Over the past decade, however, the federal govern-
ment increasingly turned to tax expenditures as a way to mitigate the 
effects of rising college costs.  The addition of the tax benefits for 
higher education introduced an unsavory amount of regressivity into 
the overall distribution of federal dollars for higher education.  Dis-
tributionally, the college tax benefits favor middle- and upper-income 
families and provide little or no benefit to lower-income families.  
Middle-income families can potentially claim educational benefits 
under both Title IV and the tax system, while lower-income families 
are effectively limited to Title IV subsidies only.  Furthermore, the fa-
vorable treatment that these college tax subsidies receive under the 
FM advantages those middle-income families who claim benefits un-
der both systems.  This interaction between the two systems magnifies 
the distributional inequities associated with the tax benefits for 
higher education standing alone.  Consolidating substantially similar 
college tax programs and coordinating them with Title IV under the 
FM can make significant equity and simplicity gains.  Furthermore, 
the federal government is more likely to achieve its public policy 
goals in providing financial aid, namely, expanding college access, af-
fordability, and savings. 
